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ABSTRACT
NICHOLAS O. HOWARD: Members and Leaders in Senate Obstruction.
(Under the direction of Jason M. Roberts)
Obstruction defines the U.S. Senate for both casual observers and scholars alike, with
filibusters among the most well known parliamentary tactics in the world. This emphasis
on public filibusters masks how obstruction shapes legislation, however. Filibusters are
the end of a long process of obstruction and management rather than a stand-alone tactic
by senators. While scholars have passingly mentioned off-floor tactics, the connections
between these procedural tools for obstruction by senators and management by leaders has
yet to be explored. This dissertation provides the first analysis of bill-level obstruction
throughout the U.S. Senate, using both on- and off-floor procedural tools. I focus on how
holds, Unanimous Consent Agreements, and filibusters are used, when these tactics can be
expected, and how they affect passage. I also ask how these tools are connected, seeking
to understand how the private actions by members and leaders shape obstruction the public
sees. I find clear patterns for when these tactics are used, that holds and Unanimous Consent
Agreements clearly relate to passage, and holds are powerful predictors of filibusters. This
dissertation explores the broader system of obstruction in the U.S. Senate, shedding light
on how obstruction actually works.
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1 OBSTRUCTION IN THE U.S. SENATE
The Senate is one of the most unusual legislative bodies in the world. Often called the
“world’s greatest deliberative body,” the chamber can produce both monumental legislation
and crippling delay. The capacity for great debate and crippling delay stem from the Senate
rules governing debate (Shepsle and Weingast 1981). These rules advantage individual
senators, often at the expense of the entire chamber’s ability to govern. This individualism,
and how it affects legislative consideration, defines the Senate.
The most well known instance of this Senate individualism is the filibuster. Filibusters
are purposefully dilatory speeches given by senators on the floor, often undertaken to delay
or kill legislation. The ability for these speeches stems from the lack of a previous question
motion, making it difficult to stop debate (Wawro and Schickler 2006; Binder and Smith
1997; Koger 2010). This stands in contrast to the modern House of Representatives, where
the majority party controls debate through special rules and agenda control (Rohde 1991;
Aldrich and Rohde 2000; Coker and Crain 1994; Cox and McCubbins 2005, 2007). Ex-
amples of famous – or occasionally infamous – filibusters abound in popular depictions
of the Senate. Huey Long’s 1935 filibuster of the National Recovery Act extension, ac-
tions against the 1890 Lodge Bill or Force Act and Rand Paul’s 2013 opposition to John
Brennans nomination are among numerous instances of the filibuster.
No example of obstruction is more famous than Strom Thurmond’s record breaking
filibuster. Thurmond rose at 8:54pm on August 28th, 1957 to speak against the 1957 Civil
Rights Act, a speech which would become among the most famous parliamentary debate
moments in American history. This record setting talk-a-thon involved Thurmond reading
the voting laws of each of the then 48 states, the U.S. criminal code, and previous Supreme
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Court decisions, among many other time-killing methods. Although Thurmond ultimately
lost the final passage vote, his filibuster remains among the more famous instances of ob-
struction in American history.
The filibuster’s place in public perception extends beyond these examples into how the
public sees the Senate. To most of the American public, the filibuster is the Senate in
practice. Americans routinely identify the filibuster as an important feature of Congress,
both for general practice and specific policy. Approximately 1/3 of respondents report
they pay attention to debates over changes to filibuster rules in repeated polls over the last
decade.1 This importance given to the filibuster is equally true for the news media supplying
information to voters. Almost 50% of news stories covering the debate over the Affordable
Care Act referenced the filibuster in some fashion (Smith and Park 2013). While the public
may value majority rule or minority rights differently depending on their personal political
opinions, the filibuster is routinely identified as an important part of American government.
This importance given to the filibuster extends to academic studies of the American
political system. Scholars routinely place the filibuster at the center of explanations for
the political system. Gridlock, punctuations in policy processes, and moderations in pol-
icy are routinely explained through the filibuster (Krehbiel 1998; Binder 2003; Jones and
Baumgartner 2005). The filibuster is also at the center of Senate scholarship. Students of
Congress have explored the usage of filibusters across time, which individuals are likely to
filibuster, and changes in how individuals use the filibuster across both their individual ca-
reers and American history (Koger 2010; Bell 2011; Overby and Bell 2004). These studies
have concerned themselves with explaining what the public sees as the most important and
defining feature of the Senate.
1These poll results are before Democrats implemented in the “nuclear option” in the 113th Congress.
Interest and knowledge increase around the November 2013 rule change for non-Supreme Court executive
nominees.
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While the filibuster is undoubtedly important, its perceived role does not take into ac-
count that the Senate primarily does not function through cloture and floor fights. Much
of the time the Senate functions through Unanimous Consent Agreements (UCAs). UCAs
are agreements negotiated between party leaders and approved by all 100 senators. These
agreements can set time limits for debate, control which amendments are considered in or-
der, ban procedural motions, and provide for specific passage procedures. UCAs represent
the Senate choosing to limit itself through actions taken by the entire chamber. Many bills
have UCAs, and UCAs controlling specific aspects of debate are not uncommon (Smith
2014). Indeed, UCAs controlling debate are far more common than filibusters and may be
as common as cloture petitions (Bell 2011).
The Senate’s reliance on UCAs to conduct its business emphasizes the importance of
non-public action in the Senate. UCAs are negotiated off-floor, often before debate ever
begins. Leaders seek these agreements to manage debate and effectively limit the possi-
bility for dilatory actions. Members agreeing to UCAs which limit amendments remove
their ability to offer obstructive amendments. Additionally, leaders can know and address
possible obstruction before it ever occurs on the floor through holds. Holds are letters by a
senator, or groups of senators, to her party leader stating their intent to object to legislation
should it come up for debate. These holds often provide a reason that a senator is object-
ing to the legislation, allowing leaders to work with members in order to prevent on floor
obstruction from occurring. Leaders can also pull bills from the floor if they are obstructed
through holds, effectively killing the bill without a filibuster ever observed.
Focusing on the filibuster largely ignores the importance these off-floor obstruction and
management efforts have on legislative outcomes. Senators objecting privately to leaders
through holds provides leaders with information about debate problems without having
to consume floor time. Leaders attempting to manage obstruction through UCAs may
circumvent filibusters through guaranteeing members the ability to speak and present their
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amendments. Holds, UCAs, and filibusters may be connected activities rather than stand-
alone tactics. The usage of one may change the probability of another occurring, with holds
likely to shape both UCAs and filibusters. More fundamentally, an exclusive focus on the
filibuster explains little about how obstruction shapes the path legislation takes through the
chamber. Incorporating more of the tools available to members and leaders provides a more
thorough understanding of legislation and obstruction.
The three chapters in this dissertation all focus on how obstruction alters the path of
legislation through the Senate. I specifically focus on the effect of obstruction and man-
agement efforts at different stages in Senate bill consideration. The ability for senators to
register objection before debate occurs has large effects on the filibuster. Bills objected to
at earlier stages are much more likely to receive objection at later stages. Leaders know
this, and work to manage the floor through UCAs. The limited attention given to these pre-
floor proceedings has hidden how obstruction actually works and what the entire process
of obstruction means for legislation. This dissertation contributes to an understanding of
how the effects of obstruction work at each stage in bill consideration by combining new
data on pre-floor bargaining with existing data and approaches for floor debate and member
preferences.
1.1 Forms of Obstruction
Scholars have long sought to understand filibusters and how chamber rules affect obstruc-
tion (Burdette 1940). Members have distinct preferences, and will act to protect and ad-
vance them (Krehbiel 1991, 1993). While joining a party does give senators some tools with
which to pursue these interests, Senate rules severely hamper their ability to act through in-
stitutionalized gatekeeping roles (Dion 1997; Jones and Baumgartner 2005). They cannot
use committees to thoroughly vet legislation while counting on party control of the floor
to block alternative proposals. Moreover, members cannot be guaranteed that their pro-
posal will be given consideration, as any member who gains the floor can make a proposal
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(Binder, Madonna and Smith 2007). While party leaders gained the right of first recogni-
tion in the 20th century, this does not guarantee that an opposed senator will not occupy
the floor in an effort to force changes to the bill or kill it outright (Campbell, Cox and Mc-
Cubbins 2002; Tiefer 1989). Finally, parties are relatively weak due to both these rules and
the leadership of the chamber set by the Constitution. The President of the Senate is the
Vice-President, who can be a member of the opposition party. Any changes to chamber or-
ganization must account for this fact, leading parties to focus on what little they can directly
control while allowing members to independently use the floor (Gold 2013; Smith 2007;
Carson, Madonna and Lynch 2011). While senators do behave as members of party teams
and supply the majority party with some advantages on the floor, Senate parties suffer at
the hands of individualistic rules (Lee and Oppenheimer 1999; Den Hartog and Monroe
2011).
These individualistic rules and weak parties have led to a focus on the floor as a way to
observe obstruction and lawmaking in the Senate. The implementation of cloture through
Rule XXII in 1917 provides a natural means through which to test the effects of rule
changes on obstruction (Wawro and Schickler 2004, 2006; Koger 2006). The changing
rules lead to wider voting margins and changing procedural votes, with 2/3 cloture votes
forcing accommodation on legislation that majority outcomes do not. Scholars have also
emphasized the changes in filibusters and management efforts as a result of these rule
changes (Koger 2010; Binder and Smith 1997). As the margin necessary to shut down
filibusters decreases, the costs of engaging in filibusters also decreases. This causes schol-
ars to frequently observe that the number of filibusters and subsequent management efforts
increase through much of the late 19th and 20th centuries. The senators engaging in fil-
ibusters has also been a focus of much scholarship. Students of the Senate have found
that ideological extremists and minority party members are more likely to filibuster (Bell
2011), retiring senators behave differently than all other senators (Overby and Bell 2004),
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and senators have various goals when engaging in filibusters (Binder 1997).
Another on-floor tactic frequently discussed are amendments and their management by
the chamber. Amendments have received attention from scholars looking for obstructive
tactics, particularly those exploring killer amendments (Jenkins and Munger 2003; Poole
and Rosenthal 2007). Controlling amendments through procedural motions to table and
filling the amendment tree, and the advantages these tactics supply to the majority party,
have come under increasing focus (Den Hartog and Monroe 2011; Smith 2014; King, Or-
lando and Rohde 2012). These non-filibuster tactics allow leaders to control senators’
amending ability while giving advantages to members of the majority party. Amendments
on the floor have the ability to undermine legislation, but leadership has tools to control
their effects during consideration.
Alternative means of obstruction and management are largely underappreciated among
students of the Senate. The Senate rarely presents single members pressing their interests
through public debate, but rather usually has bills dying before ever being considered on
the floor. Indeed, popular descriptions often note that bills and nominees die in the cham-
ber without ever receiving floor attention. Descriptions of recent “do-nothing Congresses”
often revolve around this narrative, but largely credit it to the filibuster. Far more often lead-
ers could not gain an agreement to manage the chamber, effectively killing the bill prior
to public consideration (Smith 1989; Roberts and Smith 2007; Smith 2014). The bill dies
without public objection ever registered, but this does not mean that targeted obstruction
does not exist. Leaders may be unable to garner consent to proceed due to off-floor ob-
struction in the individualistic Senate, and choose not to proceed to consider the bill (Smith
and Flathman 1989; Ainsworth and Flathman 1995).
Two studies, Evans and Lipinski (2005) and Howard and Roberts (2015), point to holds
as a means through which individual senators can obstruct individual bills before filibusters
are ever necessary. With off-floor obstruction possible on individual bills, members do not
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need to publicly object, but rather register their objections and follow through on them if
pushed to do so. Thus, what makes filibusters powerful in the eyes of the public may not
be that they are effective or represent members standing up for their beliefs, but rather that
they represent members acting on previously registered objection.
What this discussion makes clear is that obstruction is not simply a public process
played out on the Senate floor. Rather, the Senate presents numerous opportunities for
senators to obstruct and leaders to manage consideration. This dissertation asks how the
process of legislative consideration works with obstruction and management possible at
multiple stages. Specifically, what bills are obstructed in the Senate and how connected
are different types of obstruction? Previous scholars have acknowledged the presence of
multiple forms of obstruction, but often focus on larger patterns of usage or generalized
expectations rather than asking how obstruction works through multiple stages. This dis-
sertation incorporates these multiple methods of obstruction and management, working
toward establishing a bill-level picture for how obstruction functions throughout Senate
proceedings.
1.2 Outline of the Dissertation
The dissertation proceeds in three chapters, each outlining a specific part of Senate bill
consideration. Chapter 2 considers obstruction on legislation prior to floor consideration.
Senators use holds – described in more detail in chapter 2 – to register objection with party
leaders prior to floor consideration. While the origin of these holds has been “lost in the
mists of history,” and had no recognition in rules or statutes until 2007, their usage by sen-
ators is undisputed (Oleszek 2013). These holds are commonly used to inform leaders of
intention to object if the Senate moves to proceed with consideration on a bill. They serve
as a threat to legislation which members can use in an effort to either force changes to leg-
islation or undermine passage entirely. Senators can provide different messages to leaders
through holds. These messages can range from a desire to stop consideration entirely to
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modifying the legislation, and even include simply notifying the member before moving to
consider (Howard and Roberts 2015; Evans and Lipinski 2005).
The analysis presented in Chapter 2 focuses on which bills are likely to be obstructed
in this pre-floor environment. Limiting the analysis to only Senate bills reported from
committee, the analysis demonstrates that senators act in predictable, self-interested fash-
ions when using holds. First, senators are aware of the probable content of legislation. A
bill sponsor’s ideology affects the probability that a bill is targeted by holds, and bills re-
ported from high profile policy committees are also more likely to receive holds. Second, I
demonstrate that bills more widely supported within the chamber are much more likely to
be targeted by holds. Higher numbers of cosponsors for a bill lead to a greater probability
for holds, with holds seen across the range of cosponsors. Finally, I demonstrate that holds
have powerful effects on passage. Held bills are much less likely to pass the chamber, even
controlling for bill and chamber specific details.
Chapter 3 focuses on pre-floor attempts to manage the chamber by leaders. The modern
Senate has become a chamber overwhelmed with proposals and increasingly discontented
members. Pre-floor management through Unanimous Consent Agreements (UCAs) has
become one of the most important tools for chamber leaders in their efforts to control a
potentially unruly floor (Smith 2014). UCAs are agreements negotiated between leaders
and agreed to by all 100 senators which set rules for the consideration of specific bills. This
chapter focuses more specifically on complex UCAs, those which set specific provisions
for consideration rather than setting aside a minor rule. Complex UCAs control which
amendments are allowed on the floor, speaking allotments for members, when votes will
occur, and can waive specific provisions for consideration. These complex UCAs are the
closest tools Senate leaders have to special rules in the House, and can be used to shape
public consideration before it occurs.
My goal in Chapter 3 is to present an explanation for why certain bills receive complex
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UCAs while others do not. Rather than focusing on the general patterns across time for
how leaders use these controlling agreements, I focus on which bills are given these agree-
ments. I expected that the holds on a bill would lead to complex UCAs in order to manage
this potential obstruction, but did not find a relationship. Rather, complex UCAs are gen-
erally used on bills which have a much broader base of support within the chamber. Bills
with more cosponsors are more likely to receive complex UCAs, as are bills sponsored by
members of the majority party. The second portion of this chapter turns to understanding
how these agreements affect passage. Complex UCAs do lead to passage, but not for all
Senate bills referred from committee. These controlling agreements do positively predict
passage on legislation not indefinitely postponed by the Senate. These agreements appear
to serve as a means for leaders to control the Senate floor in order to push legislation toward
passage.
In Chapter 4 I move to the floor, analyzing the occurrence of filibusters and their con-
nection to other obstructive tactics. As noted above, most work on the filibuster expects that
these tactics are relatively unconnected. Filibusters are generally viewed as a standalone
tactic, with other tactics dealt with by leaders’ pre-floor management. As Chapter 3 details,
leadership management efforts do not appear to respond to holds. This leads to questions
about how members use holds and filibusters, and if these tactics may be connected. Sen-
ators threatening obstruction prior to floor consideration through holds may see their hold
not honored by leaders and respond through on-floor filibusters in protection of their in-
terests. Further, senators find value in consistently presenting objection to leaders. This
protects their future interests through establishing a reputation for objection if threatened,
putting leaders on notice that they will occupy the floor if ignored off of it.
The analyses in Chapter 4 find that holds are directly related to the incidence of fili-
busters, and that bills objectionable at earlier stages are far more likely to be found objec-
tionable even after potential leadership actions. I find a consistent, powerful relationship
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between holds and filibusters. Additionally, the presence of holds threatening to kill legisla-
tion on a bill make filibusters more likely than any other type of hold. Thus members seem
to be protecting their interests and reputations through consistent obstruction on legislation.
However, I find that filibusters do not affect passage. Rather, holds explain bill passage to
a significant degree even accounting for filibusters. The second portion of the analysis in
this chapter seeks to explain why holds do not lead to complex UCAs and filibusters may
not affect passage. I attempt to match member requests with observed behavior to address
this explanation. Using data on holds requesting the ability to offer amendments on the
floor, and matching these requests with amendments actually presented on the floor, I find
that senators are routinely denied the ability to present their desired amendments on the
floor. This does not lead to punishment for leaders, as the ability for senators to offer their
requested amendments on the floor does not lead them to vote differently on final passage.
My goal in writing this dissertation is not to provide a comprehensive, exhaustive ac-
count for how members and leaders interact on individual bills. Such an account is virtually
impossible given the multiple tools available to both members and leaders to shape consid-
eration and passage of legislation. Rather, I hope to provide a systematic and persuasive
account of how obstructive member actions on legislation fits together along with why
leaders react the way they do to these threats.
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2 OBSERVING OBSTRUCTION: HOLDS IN THE SENATE
A fundamental question in democratic representation is what becomes law. The ability to
turn citizen demands into laws centers around questions of legislative rules and legislator
interests. Elected officials have an interest in constructing institutions and passing laws
to further both individual power and reelection goals. That is, officials desire to deliver
action on constituent requests. One of the problems with this process is that individual
elected officials need not, and often do not, agree on what should be done. This potential
for disagreement is greater when these officials have the capacity to insist on consideration
for their preferred policies over others. Legislation can stall if elected officials cannot agree
to pass legislation, and this becomes more likely with individualistic legislative rules.
The tension between individual elected officials’ preferences and legislative efficiency
appears most clearly in Senate procedure. Classic depictions of Senate obstruction give
individuals great abilities to kill legislation through filibusters, but leaders can overcome
this through achieving supermajority cloture or exempting a bill from supermajoritarian
rules. This traditional thinking on obstruction prioritizes visible obstruction and leaders
managing coalitions set against these actions. This classic depiction misses many of Senate
obstruction’s forms, however. The following example illustrates why depicting obstruction
as public filibusters does not explain much of obstruction’s effects on bills in the chamber.
The Hatch Act Reform Amendments of 1988, H.R. 3400 in the 100th Congress, sought
to allow civil servants to interact with campaigns for elected office.1 After House passage
1The Hatch Act Reform Amendments was introduced by William Clay (D-MO) on November 1, 1987,
and passed in a 305-112 vote on November 17, 1987. For further detail, see Pianin, Eric and Judith Have-
mann. “Bill to Ease Hatch Act Advances.” Washington Post. October 7, 1987; Havemann, Judith. “Admin-
istration Assails Bill To Ease Hatch Act Restrictions.” Washington Post. June 4, 1987; and Causey, Mike.
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and Senate introduction, the bill remained in the Committee on Governmental Affairs until
being reported from committee and placed on the calendar on July 7, 1988.2 Committee
deliberations were contentious, but party-line divisions within committee were absent, in-
dicating that conflicts could be resolved and the bill cleared committee.3 However, the bill
remained on the calendar without ever reaching the floor or being subject to a motion to
proceed.4 Thus, the Hatch Act Reform Amendments of 1988 died a quiet death with no
visible explanation.
The Hatch Act Reform Amendments of 1988’s failure was not due to filibusters or
poison pill amendments. This is apparent from the bill’s lack of floor consideration. Rather,
it is due to the lack of floor exposure for the bill. Majority leader George Mitchell (D-
ME) and minority leader Robert Dole (R-KS) could not procure a Unanimous Consent
Agreement (UCA) which would have governed floor procedure and therefore elected to not
proceed on the floor. To negotiate a UCA guiding debate, Mitchell and Dole required the
consent of all 100 senators, and such consent was not attainable for this bill. Senators Jesse
Helms (R-NC) and Bill Roth (R-DE) sent Republican leader Dole hold letters stating their
intent to object to the bill should a motion to proceed come to the floor. Thus, these holds
undermined unanimous consent, and the leaders decided that the possibility of passing the
bill with this objection was not worth the cost of extra time on the floor should Helms
and Roth actually follow through with their threats to filibuster. These holds removed
the possibility of a UCA, and ultimately undermined any efforts to move the legislation
forward.
This example makes apparent a hidden truth in traditional depictions of Senate pro-
ceedings, which tend to focus on the filibuster as the tool of choice for obstruction-minded
“Hatch Act Hearings.” Washington Post. May 14, 1987.
2This reporting came after committee substitute amendments and an order to report issued by the full
chamber.
3Phillips, Don. “Senate Panel Approves Mild Hatch Act Revision.” Washington Post. May 20, 1988.
4Causey, Mike. “The Hatch Act Hangs On.” Washington Post. September 28,1988.
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senators. In order to understand why some bills become laws while others do not, exam-
ining the entire process of obstruction – and not just the filibuster – is essential. While
the presence or absence of filibusters provides great insight into how changes within insti-
tutions and incentives shape behavior and outcomes, characterizing filibusters as deciding
the fate of legislation is incomplete. Fully understanding what bills become law requires
understanding member actions at earlier stages of bill consideration. Using new data I col-
lected on holds during the period of Republican leaders Howard Baker (TN) and Robert
Dole (KS), I address these earlier stages in the obstructive process. This project, like those
focusing on the filibuster, takes seriously that members have both an incentive to pass leg-
islation and insist on their preferred policy being considered. With both of these premises
in mind, I pursue two goals: (1) develop and test theoretical expectations for what bills are
likely to be targeted by holds and (2) explore if these holds actually affect bill passage.
2.1 Obstructing Bills
Stating that obstruction is the defining feature of the U.S. Senate provokes relatively few
arguments, and Senate rules show the truth of this statement. Individual senators have great
power, both in the form of unlimited debate and weak centralized leaders (Smith 2014;
Lynch and Madonna N.d.; Koger 2006; Sinclair 1989; Gamm and Smith 2002; Binder and
Smith 1997; Binder 1997). Both popular and scholarly attention to obstruction, particularly
in the case of the Senate, has produced great insight on public displays of dilatory intent
– filibusters in the congressional world (Binder, Lawrence and Smith 2002; Binder 2003;
Krehbiel 1998; Koger 2010; Smith 2014; Jenkins and Munger 2003; Lee 2009). Unlimited
debate and dilatory amendments can be overcome through supermajority cloture votes on
the floor, but is often easier to manage through pre-floor UCAs (Wawro and Schickler
2006; Oppenheimer 1985; Sinclair 2002; Smith 1989; Smith and Flathman 1989).5 UCAs
require truly unanimous consent, and one member obstructing can undermine debate. Thus,
5Recent changes in non-Supreme Court nominations lowered the cloture threshold for these items to a
majority vote, but nominations fall outside the purview of this paper (Oleszek 2013).
understanding what bills are targeted by obstruction requires developing an understanding
of not only what bills are likely to have publicly observable obstruction but what bills are
likely to have any type of obstruction observable to party leaders.
The most prevalent mechanism for obstruction is through holds. As seen in the Hatch
Act Reform Amendments example, holds threaten on-floor objection, undermine potential
UCAs, and stop legislation before bills ever reach the floor. Figure 2.1 presents an example
of a hold from Jesse Helms (R-NC) in the 104th Congress. As can be seen here, the hold is
a statement that a senator will obstruct proceedings in some fashion if the Senate chooses
to proceed to consideration of the bill. What is obvious here is that while filibusters provide
valuable insight into dilatory behavior, the broader context is fundamental to understanding
when obstruction can be expected.
Filibusters, while widely discussed and publicly known, are the end point of the ob-
struction process. Multiple other actors make decisions before a filibuster is observed, and
I look at the earlier decision of when holds are used to test potential effects of obstruction.
To illustrate this difference in approach and focus, Figure 2.2 lays out the obstructive pro-
cess. I also make two assumptions about the process’ early stages. First, senators desire
to have policy made at their ideal point and will introduce legislation which accomplishes
this goal. Second, committees carefully vet all legislation within their defined jurisdiction.
Thus, bills that reach the floor are roughly representative of their sponsor and have a chance
of passing the Senate.
Figure 2.2 shows that after being received by party leaders from committees and placed
on the calendar, senators choose whether to or not to place a hold on the specific piece of
legislation at this point.6 While different types of holds are undoubtedly important, and I
return to this distinction later in this chapter and dissertation, I choose not to focus on it at
6This operates on a bill-by-bill basis, with a senator targeting an individual bill. Hold letters, such as in
Figure 2.1, need not target only one bill. However, senators wishing to target multiple bills within a single
letter declare objection to each bill separately. Thus this process’ integrity is preserved even though senators
can direct holds to multiple bills simultaneously.
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Figure 2.1: Example Hold
15
Figure 2.2: Process of Obstruction
Bill Introduced
Committee Referral
Report
Hold
Pull Bill Accommodate
Obstruct Not
Not Accommodate
Obstruct Not
No Hold
Obstruct Not
Not
this point for purposes of clarity while returning to it in later sections.7 Leaders then choose
a strategy with which to respond to senators’ holding behavior. If a hold is not observed, the
bill is introduced on the floor.8 When senators place holds on a bill, the choice leaders face
becomes more complex. Leaders can either choose to pull a bill targeted by a hold from
the calendar, move forward with the bill after offering some accommodation to holding
senators, or proceed with the bill in its current form by ignoring the hold.9 This choice
7Howard and Roberts (2015) provide extensive treatment of this data and how hold types are distributed
across Congresses.
8While undoubtedly an oversimplification, its purpose is twofold. First, filibuster discussions primarily
center upon this path, often implicitly assuming holds kill bills. Second, while interest groups, caucuses, and
time pressures may push items off the agenda, the focus here is on the connection between senator behavior
and leader response.
9This may be due to both the nature of the bill, as some bills such as budgets are must-pass, and the nature
of the holder, as holders with extreme ideologies are less likely to be successful in stopping passage (Howard
and Roberts 2015; Krehbiel 1998).
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primarily depends on the action desired, the availability of time, and importance of the
legislation. After either of the last two strategies, the bill is placed on the floor and senators
choose whether or not to obstruct on the floor.10 Finally, the bill passes or not given the
results of the previous stage and its level of support.
Obstructionist research primarily focuses on the No Hold-Obstruct path, as it is as-
sumed that this is the path through which observable filibusters occur. Apparent in Figure
2.2 is that this stage, as well as all others, exists as part of a larger process of consideration.
That is, while filibusters are valuable means through which senators can register observable
objection and are important in their own right, the presence of a filibuster is tied to the pres-
ence of a hold. Thus, to understand how floor obstruction occurs we must first understand
what is likely to be obstructed before a bill ever reaches the floor.
Unlike much previous research, the question here is not “who places hold letters?” but
rather “what is held and why?” A senator prefers to have policy made at her ideal point,
regardless of institutional rules or passage procedures. The difficulty in this is that each
senator insisting on her ideal point creates unstable political environments (Gilligan and
Krehbiel 1987; Krehbiel 1991). More ideologically extreme members hold more often, but
this tells us little about what is targeted by holds (Howard and Roberts 2015; Evans and
Lipinski 2005). Additionally, while rules changes alter the utility of public filibusters, this
tells us little about what is likely to be targeted (Wawro and Schickler 2006, 2004; Koger
2010; Binder and Smith 1997). What I undertake here is to look at how obstruction is
utilized on a bill-by-bill basis. Thus, the central question of this chapter is what aspects of
a piece of legislation make it more and less likely that it is targeted for obstruction?
10This can include simply expanding the number and duration of speeches and introducing a greater num-
ber of amendments. In short, obstructionist activity is primarily considered a pure delay tactic, but it need not
be only this.
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2.1.1 Bills Targeted by Holds
The process outlined in Figure 2.2 provides several avenues for legislative consideration
and objection. Not every bill that comes up for consideration on the floor will be targeted
by objection through holds. Senators must perceive a benefit to placing holds in some
situations rather than others – implying that the action has consequences and costs – and
leaders cannot successfully construct compromise bills to prevent holds. Holds are indeed
observed on legislation, but only on approximately 15% of Senate originated bills reported
from committee. Thus, holds occur on a regular basis, but are not utilized as a blanket
strategy by members.11 Understanding what drives this variation in hold usage provides a
key insight into how senators view bills.
The rationale for senators obstructing individual legislation lies in senators knowing
their own interests. While party affiliation may guide many procedural actions on the floor,
a senator’s personal policy interests extend beyond simply supporting the party. A senator
has legislation she prefers to be made into law, and will take actions to see this happen.
Additionally, she has a general worldview that dictates the bills supported and opposed.
A senator prefers legislation similar to her own interests and will oppose legislation she
dislikes.
I assume a senator desires to have policy made at her ideal point, and is more likely to
favor a bill as its content approaches this ideal point.12 Thus, a senator will be more likely
to obstruct a given piece of legislation as the ideal point of the policy moves further away
from the senator’s ideal point. If, as in the discussion above, we assume that the sponsor
introduces policy which maximizes personal policy benefits, then the distinction is between
the ideal point of sponsor and the ideal point of the possibly obstructing senator. As the
distance between the sponsor’s ideal point and obstructing senator’s ideal point decreases,
11In what follows I build on – but differ in focus from – Krehbiel (1985), which focuses on why an
individual member holds a given bill due to logrolling across bills.
12Both linear loss functions ( |xi xp|) and quadratic loss function ( (xi xp)2), where xi is the policy
ideal point of the senator and xp is the point of the policy are functional forms.
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a bill should be less likely to be held.
Hypothesis 1: As a bill sponsor’s ideology becomes further from a senator’s, holds will be
more likely.
More widely supported bills should be more likely to pass the chamber, with greater
support on both procedural motions and final passage votes. Bills following the process
shown in Figure 2.2 with a percentage of senators potentially greater than a majority in
favor of this bill makes the bill likely to be approved by the chamber median and the
supermajority pivot (Krehbiel 1998). This legislation should also be more likely to be
the target of holds, however. Opposing senators know that if the bill comes to the floor they
will have to obstruct through actions such as filibusters in order to prevent passage – and
may lose even with a filibuster. Opposing senators thus engage in pre-floor obstruction on
more widely supported Senate bills to prevent them from reaching the floor at all. Leaders,
seeing a hold, may decide the bill is not worth managing potential floor objection, even
if this objection is likely to be overcome. Thus, while more popular legislation should be
more likely to be put on the floor, it is also more likely to be targeted by holds.
Hypothesis 2: As visible support for a bill increases, holds will be more likely.
Filibusters and holds become more powerful as time remaining in the legislative session
decreases (Wawro and Schickler 2006; Howard and Roberts 2015). Legislation obstructed
later in a session is less likely to pass the chamber. While this implies that obstruction
is a powerful force near the end of a session, it does not take into account the cost of
engaging in this obstruction. Engaging in obstruction has a cost directly related to time
and pending legislation. A senator has policies she would like to see made into law. Early
in a Congress, placing a hold does not radically diminish the probability her policy goals
are made into law as time remains plentiful. Obstructing any individual bill does not take
away a large percentage of the time remaining to consider other legislation. As Congress
moves toward the end of its term this lack of consequence for obstruction is less true.
19
Time becomes more scarce, and any individual action consumes a larger percentage of
remaining time. Any action a senator takes will have a greater effect on the probability a
bill she prefers will be considered. Obstruction compounds this time scarcity, with time-
killer objection consuming increasingly scarce time that could be used to consider their own
legislation. Thus the chance of considering a bill depends more heavily on the senator’s
own obstructionist actions. The senator engaging in obstructionist activity has a higher
probability of her preferred legislation becoming part of the obstructed backlog due to
her own actions. Without changing any of the direct costs of obstruction, such as public
visibility and leader recalcitrance, the costs of engaging in obstruction increase as time
decreases.
Hypothesis 3: Holds will be more likely on bills introduced early in a Congress.
Finally, bill content presents useful information to senators beyond sponsor details.
Separate classes of legislation exist simultaneously in Congress. The most obvious example
is ceremonial legislation, such as post office renamings, versus non-ceremonial legislation,
such as the Affordable Care Act.13 Legislation that deals with more issues is more likely
to be held, as there are more areas on which senators can alter and object. More senators
have interests represented in these bills, and thus the probability that one chooses to place
a hold increases. Bills with broader implications are more likely to be considered in a
few specified and higher profile committees, such as the Government Affairs and Judiciary
Committees.14
Hypothesis 4: Bills referred to higher profile committees will be more likely to be targeted
by holds.
In short, senators are perceived to be knowledgeable about both their interests and how
exercising their procedural prerogatives alters these interests. What drives their obstructive
13Holds on reported ceremonial bills are rare, with only one in the 95th (1977-1978) and 97th (1981-1982)
Congresses combined.
14These may also be likely to be must-pass bills, implying that the process of referral location and related
hold behavior should appear the same.
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behavior is a combination of bill-specific parameters and institutional circumstance. The
specifics of the sponsor, a bill’s popularity, consideration time remaining, and the general
bill content pushes members to perceive bills differently. They know that placing a hold
causes leaders to react certain ways depending upon these things as well, and adjust their
strategy accordingly (Ainsworth and Flathman 1995). With this theoretical basis in place,
I now move to translating this theory into observable metrics.
2.2 Research Design
To test the theory outlined above I utilize a dataset of holds I gathered from the Robert J.
Dole Archive and a set of holds gathered by Evans and Lipinski (2005) from the Howard
Baker Archive to explore this process. This dataset provides a record of holds placed by
Republicans in the 95th, 97th, and 99th-104th Congresses. These data provide a summary
of the target of the hold, the day the hold was placed, and the general type of hold, providing
for a general test of hold dynamics.15
This available holds data relates only to Republican holds. This implies that Sponsor
Ideology measured through first dimension DW-NOMINATE should be negatively related
to hold placement. Thus, as Sponsor Ideology increases – becomes more conservative – the
probability of a hold on a bill should decrease. Treating sponsors as important actors in bill
content and viability requires several controls for sponsors, including Sponsor Seniority
and Sponsor Committee Leader status. Translating visible support is far more direct, as
the number of Cosponsors provides a close corollary to if a bill is likely to pass (Krehbiel
1998). I also consider time as a steadily decreasing function, with Months Remaining
serving as this proxy.16
15For the 97th and 99th-104th Congresses I have additional information based on the letters. Much of this
detail is presented in Howard and Roberts (2015), and some of this will be utilized later in this paper. I utilize
the 95th Congress, but acknowledge the lack of letters shown in Figure 2.1.
16Models estimated with a separate control for introduction in the last two months of a Congress, to account
for filibuster findings in Wawro and Schickler (2004), do not demonstrate different results.
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Choosing how to treat bill content through committee referral proves far less clear. Sev-
eral options for this exist, but I begin with the committee classification system provided by
Deering and Smith (1997).17 This approach utilizes both the observed behavior of senators
through their requests to serve on specific committees and the types of policies committees
produce in order to generate categories of committees.18 A Policy Committee is the highest
profile type of committee in which a bill can be considered, thus I utilize a dummy variable
for all bills considered in this type of committee.
Also important to consider for both content effects and possible popularity measures
is the presence of Multiple Referral for bills. These bills should be more likely to receive
holds, as they have been considered by a wider range of senators before reporting to party
leaders, and therefore opposing senators may believe these bills are more likely to pass.
Additionally, this helps control for consideration in non-high profile committees. Finally, I
employ controls for institutional circumstances for both the chamber, Republican Majority
and whether a bill has aMajority Sponsor.
2.3 Results
As this study concerns itself with what is held and what affects this behavior the unit of
observation will be the individual bill rather than the individual senator. Furthermore, I re-
strict my analysis to only Senate originated bills which have been reported from committee,
as discussed above with Figure 2.2.19 These are the bills most likely to pass as they have
been carefully vetted and approved by committees.20 Holds speak to a senator’s perception
17Two alternatives, controlling for referral to a specific committee through a series of dummy variables and
controlling for referral to any category of committee provided by Deering and Smith, exist. Each approach
has appeal, but my approach provides a more specific test of the theoretical mechanism with only marginal
loss in specific information.
18Policy committees in Deering and Smith (1997) are: Budget, Foreign Relations, Governmental Affairs,
Judiciary, and Labor. Several studies have utilized a similar approach to generating categories of committees,
including Fenno (1973).
19I focus on “S type” Senate bills which must be passed by both the Senate and House and signed by the
president to become laws in the following analysis.
20I acknowledge that senators can, and do, place holds on bills before reaching the floor, but given the
rarity of this I choose to focus on Senate obstruction’s broader framework.
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of a bill relative to her own priorities and perceptions, and focusing on bills more likely to
pass the chamber accounts for this logic. Table 2.1 provides results for models related to
what bills are held. The outcomes variable is Table 2.1 is if a bill received a hold or not,
and each bill is a separate observation. Thus, each coefficient in Table 2.1 provides the
relationship between the associated covariate and the presence – or absence – of a hold.
Table 2.1: Senate Bills Subject to a Hold
Variable All Bills Majority Sponsor Minority Sponsor
Cosponsors 0.025⇤ 0.027⇤ 0.013
(0.003) (0.004) (0.008)
Sponsor Ideology -0.744⇤ -0.915⇤ -1.331
(0.200) (0.320) (0.776)
Months Remaining 0.006 0.006 0.004
(0.008) (0.009) (0.024)
Policy Committee 0.258⇤ 0.176 0.663⇤
(0.104) (0.113) (0.305)
Multiple Referral 0.466⇤ 0.379 0.948
(0.188) (0.204) (0.498)
Sponsor Seniority 0.045⇤ 0.060⇤ -0.024
(0.014) (0.016) (0.042)
Committee Leader Sponsor -0.198 -0.324⇤ 0.454
(0.132) (0.143) (0.361)
Republican Majority -0.892⇤ -0.729⇤ -1.399⇤
(0.148) (0.237) (0.566)
Majority Sponsor 0.570⇤ - -
(0.159) - -
Dole as Leader -0.198 -0.282⇤ 0.380
(0.119) (0.127) (0.378)
Intercept -2.391⇤ -1.848⇤ -2.534⇤
(0.238) (0.225) (0.624)
N 3096 2513 583
Log-likelihood -1316.792 -1133.138 -176.106
Note: Estimates are from an logistic regression model. The outcome variable is coded 1 if the bill was
targeted by a hold 0 if it was not. Standard errors in parentheses. ⇤ = p  0.05.
Column 1 in Table 2.1 presents the model for all Senate bills. Holding all over vari-
ables in the model constant, the addition of one more Cosponsor for a bill increases the
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probability that a bill is targeted by a hold, on average. This can be seen graphically in
Figure 2.3. Moving from one standard deviation below the mean number of cosponsors to
one standard deviation above the mean number of cosponsors makes holds 8% more likely.
In short, when a greater number of senators approve of a bill, and the bill is perhaps more
likely to pass, holds are more likely to be observed on that bill.
The effects of Sponsor Ideology, measured through DW-NOMINATE, also follows the
above theory. Table 2.1 demonstrates that as a sponsor’s ideology increases, or becomes
more conservative, Republicans are less likely to place a hold on this bill. Figure 2.4
demonstrates that as bill sponsors become more conservative, and therefore more like a
randomly selected Republican on average, they are less likely to have holds target their
bills. Senators are less likely to hold bills whose sponsors are more like themselves, as
these bills are more preferred.
The effect of committee type for all Senate bills reported from committee provides clear
results, as the effect for Policy Committee is positive and statistically significant. Thus,
bills referred to these higher profile committees are more likely to be targeted by holds on
average. Senators are more likely to use holds on bills considered in these committees,
implying a difference in how obstruction is used across different levels of salience. Bills
considered in policy committees are 3.4% more likely to be held than bills considered in
other committees. While this result cannot speak to differences across individual bills,
the relationship between committee consideration and obstruction usage speaks to how
senators perceive obstruction as tool to shape consideration.21
Having moreMonths Remaining between a bill’s introduction and the end of a Congress
has no statistically significant effect on the probability of a hold on the bill. This non-
significant result is not due to the difference between the sessions, as inserting a dummy
21It is possible that senators may place holds on these bills in order to further their own interests and force
a log roll among other senators (Arnold 1990; Krehbiel 1985), but I am focused on the occurrence of holds
here.
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Figure 2.3: Effect of Cosponsors on Probability A Bill is Held
0 20 40 60 80 100
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
●●
●
● ●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
●
●
● ●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●●
●
● ●
●
●● ●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ● ●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●●
● ●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
● ●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
● ●
●●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
● ●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●● ●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●●
● ●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
● ●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●● ●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
●
● ●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
●
●
●
●
●●
● ●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
●
●
● ●
●
●
● ●
●
●
●
● ●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●● ●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
●
●
●●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●● ●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●● ●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
●
● ●● ●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
Pr
ed
ict
ed
 Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y o
f H
old
Cosponsors
Point Estimate
95% Conf. Interval
25
Figure 2.4: Effect of Sponsor Ideology on Probability A Bill is Held
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variable for each session does not affect this result.22 A likely explanation for this non-
statistically significant effect is that senators face cross-pressures when considering time.
A senator knows that any bill she obstructs is less likely to pass the chamber, but will also
lower the time remaining to consider her own legislation. These cross-pressures likely lead
to inconsistent behavior across legislation, providing this non-statistically significant result.
Multiple Referred bills are more likely to be targeted by holds than bills considered in
a single committee, all else constant. That is, even controlling for policy committee con-
sideration and level of public support, bills considered within more than one committee are
more likely to be obstructed by Republicans. These bills have been approved by a greater
number of senators, as they have been considered by multiple committees. Consideration
in multiple committees increases the probability of a hold on the bill by 7%. A senator
opposing this legislation understands that this bill is more likely to pass the chamber due to
increased support from institutional gatekeepers. This senator will act to prevent consider-
ation and stop passage, as increased vetting and approval may lead to increased support in
a floor vote.23 This result is again indicative that senators act to protect their interests and
object to bills they oppose which are more likely to pass.
The controls also present interesting results. Bills with an institutionally powerful Com-
mittee Leader Sponsor pushing for passage are no more likely to be obstructed than bills
with non-committee leader sponsors. While increased consideration frommultiple commit-
tees considering legislation makes holds more likely, the committee position for sponsors
has no statistically significant effect. However, greater Sponsor Seniority for bills does
make them more likely to be targeted by holds, on average. Thus the potential power for
a sponsor does have some effect, but may lie more in the sponsor’s perceived place within
22Senators may perceive late holds as less effective, but Howard and Roberts (2015) demonstrate that
outright stoppage holds placed toward the end of a congress are actually more effective on average, however.
23It is probable that either the greater winnowing effect from multiple committees or the increased pop-
ularity from more members approving the bill causes this effect to appear. The difficulty of discriminating
between these explanations is that I do not know what multiply referred bills would be like without being
considered in more than one committee.
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the Senate than her institutional power.
Bills are less likely to held by Republicans when there is a Republican Majority than
with a Republican minority. A senator is more likely to agree with legislation introduced by
members of her own party. A higher percentage of bills will be both sponsored by members
of her party and reported from committee when in the majority. As a senator will act less
against legislation they support, holds should be less frequent on bills introduced when
Republicans are in the majority. Thus this finding fits with expectations about preferences
and parties.
Additionally, bills with a Majority Sponsor are more likely to be the target of a hold,
on average. This is most likely due to one of two processes. First, majority party bills are
likely to be more numerous as there are more members, but this is unlikely to explain this
finding. The alternate possibility is that, as Den Hartog and Monroe (2011) find, majority
parties and majority party members have a fundamental advantage in Senate legislative
consideration. Bill opponents know that majority sponsored legislation is more likely to
pass the chamber due to this advantage, and will be more likely to place a hold on this bill.
This corroboration of previous findings related to majority party advantage led to a
splitting of the data between majority party sponsored and minority party sponsored legis-
lation.24 These results are presented in Columns 2 and 3 of Table 2.1. The primary interest
here are similarities – and differences – between Republican senators targeting legislation
across majority and minority sponsorship.
The effects of public support for a bill are consistent across both majority and minority
sponsored legislation, and corresponds with the finding for all bills. Adding one additional
Cosponsor to a bill increases the probability that said bill is targeted by a hold, on average,
for both majority and minority sponsored legislation. This effect only reaches statistical
significance for majority sponsored legislation, however. More popular legislation is more
24This procedure is functionally equivalent to interacting Majority Sponsor with all other variables in the
model.
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likely to be targeted for obstructionist activity.
Similar to the results for all bills, Sponsor Ideology is negative for both majority and
minority sponsored legislation. Again, this effect does not reach statistical significance for
minority sponsored legislation. As the sponsor becomes more conservative Republicans
are less likely to hold the bill. Months Remaining is also similar to the result for all bills,
with the effects for majority and minority sponsored legislation in the predicted direction
but not reaching statistical significance for either set of bills.
The effect of legislative content, as measured by the type of committee in which a
bill is considered, on hold usage varies across sponsor majority status. Majority sponsored
legislation considered in a Policy Committee is more likely to be the target of holds, but does
not reach statistical significance. The effect for minority sponsored legislation is positive
and statistically significant. Thus, bills considered within high profile Policy Committees
are more likely to be the target of holds, on average.
Multiple Referral for legislation is positive for both types of legislation, but does not
reach statistical significance for either majority or minority sponsored bills. Interestingly,
Sponsor Seniority is positive and statistically significant for majority sponsored legislation,
but negative and not statistically significant for minority sponsored bills. While having
a Committee Leader Sponsor was not statistically significant and negative for all bills,
it is statistically significant and negative for majority sponsored bills but not for minority
bills. Finally, a control for the different periods indicates that majority sponsored legislation
was less likely to be held under Dole, on average, but no such effect appears for minority
sponsored legislation.
These results provide explanations consistent with the hypotheses presented above.
Legislation with more Cosponsors is more likely to be targeted by Republican holds. Bills
with more ideologically conservative sponsors are less likely to be held, regardless of spon-
sor majority status. On average, bills referred to Policy Committees are more likely to be
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held. While I do not find that more Months Remaining for bill consideration affects the
probability a bill is targeted by a hold, my findings are consistent with my expectations.
Senators opposed to legislation are knowledgable of their own interests, and are equally
aware of when legislation which goes against these interests is likely to pass. These sit-
uations where senators oppose a bill likely to pass is where holds are more likely to be
observed. Given this understanding of what bills are targeted, I move on to if senators
receive any benefits from holding bills.
2.4 The Effects of Holds on Bills
With these consistent results I turn to the effect of holds. The process in Figure 2.2 of
senators holding, leaders responding, and senators obstructing assumes that holds shape
leader strategy and the probability that a bill passes the Senate. That is, if a hold is not
observed I presume that leaders will not pull a bill from the calendar, whereas held bills
can be pulled from the calendar or defeated on the floor. This implies that bills on which
holds are observed should pass the Senate at lower rates than non-held bills, as they signal
to leaders a need to potentially change strategies.
This type of response is not guaranteed, as leaders can choose to honor a hold or not.
While the holds by Roth and Helms discussed above were successful in stopping the Hatch
Act Reform Amendments of 1988, pulling the bill or altering its content is a choice by
leaders. Contrary to this, The Neighborhood Schools Improvement Act, introduced on
January 14, 1991, was held by Jesse Helms but considered and eventually passed on the
floor.25 Thus, the possibility exists that the example of the Hatch Act Reform Amendments
of 1998 is an exception to the general process.
To test if holds affect passage of Senate bills, Table 2.2 presents logistic regression
models for Senate passage of Senate bills. The dependent variable in these models is the
passage of a bill in the Senate, and the coefficients represent the relationship between an
25This bill sought to expand resource provisions for achieving the National Education Goals.
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increase in an independent variable and the probability of a bill passing the Senate. The
theory presented above assumes that a senator acts to protect their own interest, and engag-
ing in obstruction through holds makes bills she opposes less likely to pass the chamber.
This means that the primary covariate of interest in Table 2.2, Held Bill, will be negatively
related to bill passage.
Column 1 in Table 2.2 provides a test of the relationship between holds and passage for
all Senate bills referred from committee. Strikingly apparent in this model is the relation-
ship between the presence of a hold on a bill and its probability of passage. Controlling
for traditional passage effects, including cosponsors, time remaining at introduction, and
chamber configuration, the presence of a hold dramatically lowers the probability that a bill
passes the Senate. On average, the presence of a hold on a bill lowers the probability of the
bill passing the Senate by 21% with a maximum effect of 26%. This indicates that holds on
bills do affect bill passage. Their use significantly lowers the probability that bills become
laws, both statistically and substantively.
Additionally, holds placed by different senators may have different purposes. A senator
can state their desire to be notified of the consideration, change the content of the bill
through amendments, or stop consideration and passage of the bill entirely. Howard and
Roberts (2015) develop classifications of holds depending on a senator’s expressed goal in
their hold letter sent to the party leader.26 Of particular interest here is if holds desiring to
stop legislation have a larger effect on passage than all holds together. Thus I will use the
presence of a killer hold to measure this. Killer holds are those holds which state a desire to
stop consideration and passage of legislation without giving a possible method to overcome
this objection. That is, they are stating that their goal is to kill the legislation rather than
change it before consideration and passage. To test if killer holds lower the probability of
26Howard and Roberts (2015) develop a six part coding system for Republican holds. The system is: 1)
Outright Hold to kill legislation 2) Specific Amendment Request to put in bill 3) General Amendment Request
to put unspecified amendment in bill 4) Specific Demands to remove part of bill 5) Requests for Notification
before motion to proceed 6) Requests for Delay before bringing bill to floor.
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Table 2.2: Bill Passage in the Senate
Variable Model 1 Model 2
Held Bill -0.961⇤ -
(0.106) -
Killer Held Bill - -0.962⇤
- (0.135)
Cosponsors 0.006⇤ 0.004
(0.003) (0.003)
Sponsor Ideology 0.443⇤ 0.483⇤
(0.130) (0.129)
Months Remaining 0.025⇤ 0.023⇤
(0.006) (0.006)
Policy Committee -0.110 -0.129
(0.082) (0.081)
Multiple Referral -1.047⇤ -1.056⇤
(0.180) (0.179)
Sponsor Seniority -0.013 -0.014
(0.011) (0.011)
Committee Leader Sponsor 0.068 0.074
(0.098) (0.097)
Republican Majority -1.065⇤ -1.056⇤
(0.097) (0.097)
Majority Sponsor -0.035 -0.078
(0.100) (0.099)
Dole as Leader -0.578⇤ -0.630⇤
(0.091) (0.092)
Intercept 0.847⇤ 0.896⇤
(0.168) (0.168)
N 3096 3096
Log-likelihood -2005.515 -2022.123
Note: Estimates are from an logistic regression model. The outcome variable is coded 1 if the bill passed the
Senate and 0 if it did not. Standard errors in parentheses. ⇤ = p  0.05.
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passage as a separate group, I estimate the logistic regression model presented in Column 2
of Table 2.2. The covariate of interest here is if a bill is the target of a killer hold, indicated
through the dichotomous Killer Held Bill, rather than any hold.27 These holds should lower
the probability of passage, as this is the stated purpose of the hold.
Column 2 of Table 2.2 presents the results of this model. The effect for Killer Held Bill
is negative and statistically significant, implying that bills targeted by these killer holds are
much less likely to pass the Senate. A bill targeted by a killer hold is 22% less likely to
pass the Senate than a bill not targeted by a killer hold. While this effect is dramatic, it
is very similar to that for all held bills in Column 1 of Table 2.2. The results indicate that
senators utilizing these holds do get what they want on average, but there is not a dramatic
difference when senators engage in the most direct threat possible opposed to other types.
Holds do stop the passage of legislation, both for all holds taken together and killer
holds separately. While holds may be a symbol for larger objection to the bill, the results
show that this obstruction dramatically lowers the chances a bill is passed by the Senate.
This stops any chance the bill has to become law, indicating that holds directly affect Con-
gressional policymaking. The actions taken by individual senators shape the outcome of
legislation in terms of passage. This provides consistent evidence that senators take action
on bills assuming that these actions will shape outcomes.
2.5 Discussion
This chapter has concerned itself with the place of holds within the legislative process
and how they are utilized. It provides an explanation of two fundamental processes in
legislative deliberation. First, I have established a process through which both leaders
and members knowingly allow obstruction on a bill-by-bill basis. Members are served
well, as they can protect their interests, but leaders also gain by receiving information
about potentially difficult legislation. Second, the theory and models above provide the
27The covariate of interest in this model is thus a subset of the covariate of interest for the model in Column
1.
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first explanation for both holds affecting bill passage and which bills we can expect to be
subjected to holds.
From this discussion it is clear that holds do alter the probability that bills pass the Sen-
ate. This result is perhaps not surprising given what we expect from previous studies of the
filibuster, but this is the first systematic demonstration that holds do lower the probability a
bill is passed by the Senate. Furthermore, this result relates to only Senate bills reported by
Senate committees, a tougher test for obstructionist activity than sampling from all possible
legislation.
My findings also speak to the relationship between individual bills, institutional cir-
cumstances, and opposing senators. It is apparent in the models and discussions above that
senators view bills differently when choosing to engage in obstruction through holds. The
content of legislation appears to structure the decision to hold a bill, but the specifics of
this circumstance may depend on the majority status of a bill sponsor. That support for a
bill affects decisions to register a hold is not surprising, but important to remember when
considering how cosponsorship affects bill passage rates. Additionally, senators seem to be
attentive to the identity of a bill sponsor when utilizing holds. Bills in Republican majority
Congresses are targeted less frequently by Republican senators, and the ideological conser-
vatism of the sponsor affects hold usage. The effects of time were in the expected direction,
but not statistically significant. Holds may be more effective as Congresses draw to an end,
but slowing the entire agenda at a Congresses end does not drive hold usage. The process
behind how support and time may interact, as well as how supporters and opponents utilize
different types of obstruction together, are worthwhile areas for future research.
More visible forms of obstruction, such as filibusters and pushing for cloture votes, do
receive a great deal of attention. This study makes the case that understanding holds pro-
vides valuable insight into the lawmaking process. Viewing filibusters as primary evidence
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of obstruction is a potentially fruitful exercise, but our understanding could be greatly en-
hanced with careful analysis of off-floor obstruction. This project pursues the broad strokes
of when obstruction is utilized, but does not deal in detail with how it is related to other pro-
cesses and its micro-level effects. Further work is needed to understand when obstruction
is actually successful in its goals and when leaders can safely choose to ignore a senator’s
registered objection. While focusing on the floor is valuable, pursuing how legislative bar-
gaining works prior – and parallel – to this visible deliberation has the potential to greatly
enhance what we know about the American political process.
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3 MANAGING OBSTRUCTION: UNANIMOUS CONSENT AGREEMENTS
The path of H.R. 3103 through the 104th Congress presents an interesting case study
on the effect of Senate procedure on legislative outcomes. Originally designed to limit
exclusions based on preexisting conditions, the bill was the Republican counter to Clinton’s
pursuit of health care reform and shaped related rhetoric in the 1996 presidential campaign.
Although the bill was relatively uncontroversial in the House, this changed in the Senate.1
A bipartisan filibuster by Edward Kennedy (D-MA) and Nancy Kassebaum (R-KS) sought
to either fundamentally change the bill’s content or stop passage of the House’s legislation.2
Even with these filibusters, the bill passed the Senate on April 23, and was signed into law
on August 21, 1996. This bill, more commonly known as the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act of 1996, or HIPAA, is one of the lasting centerpieces of President
Clinton’s legacy.
The bill passed over the public objection of Kennedy and Kassebaum in large part due
to pre-floor negotiations by party leaders. Republican majority leader Robert Dole (KS)
and Democratic minority leader George Mitchell (ME) were able to move HIPPA through
the Senate with a Unanimous Consent Agreement (UCA), negotiated before floor debate
began, which established the date of final passage.3 Due to the UCA, obstruction was ended
1H.R. 3103 was introduced in the House on March 18, 1996, reported from Ways and Means on March
25, and passed on March 28. HIPAA was also referred to the House Commerce, Judiciary, and Economic
and Education Committees. These committees were given additional time to consider the bill, but the final
passage vote was held before the extended reporting deadline with no reports given. The bill passed on a
recorded vote, with Republicans voting 299-1 in favor and Democrats 149-38 against.
2Note that this bill was the target of multiple procedural tabling and cloture motions. See Dewar, Helen.
“Striving to Lead, Dole Stumbles Into a Week of Setbacks.” Washington Post. April 21, 1995.
3As discussed in Chapter 2, a Unanimous Consent Agreement (UCA) is an agreement between party
leaders, and agreed to by all 100 senators, which covers any or all of floor activity, passage procedure,
amendment limitations, and setting the time of final consideration prior to floor consideration.
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within the time limit, the Senate’s more moderate language inserted into the bill, and final
consideration was a relatively smooth process.4 What is apparent here is that the presence
of public objection to legislation is not sufficient to explain HIPPA’s ultimate fate. Pre-
floor bargaining and controlling floor proceedings can be even more important to guiding
consideration to a successful outcome.
While Chapter 2 considered what legislative details make bills more likely to receive
holds, this ignores the next step highlighted in the HIPPA example. Members can, and as
we have seen do, threaten to obstruct legislation, leaders can manage these threats and the
legislation they target. Controlling floor proceedings through developing UCAs for spe-
cific bills circumvents the generally lacking floor rules, providing structure and deadlines
for consideration. Fully understanding the process of obstruction and bill consideration
thus requires developing an understanding of when controlling agreements occur, their ef-
fects, and why different patterns emerge. Controlling the floor may be critical to managing
member needs and threats, and should shape passage in the chamber.
Despite the place of pre-floor bargaining in Senate procedure, as well as the acknowl-
edged importance of this process by students of Congress, scholars have a limited system-
atic understanding of leadership control on legislative outcomes. This is due to both the
secrecy of this bargaining and the difficulty in obtaining usable data on each part of this
process. Existing empirical studies focus on only select bills within individual Congresses,
with broader analyses only existing among game theoretic analyses (Smith 1989, 2005,
2014; Krehbiel 1985; Ainsworth and Flathman 1995). This chapter is an analysis of com-
plex UCAs, which are those managing floor consideration of bills in terms of amendments,
timing, and voting procedures, in an attempt to develop a more systematic understanding
of how off-floor agreements are developed and shape outcomes. I utilize a newly gathered
4The bill was ultimately amended by substituting the language of S. 1028, the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act of 1995, after the enacting clause. H.R. 3103 passed through the Senate with no
referral, but S. 1028 was referred to, and reported by, the Committee on Labor and Human Resources.
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dataset of complex UCAs in the 99th Congress, along with data on Republican holds and
Senate amendments in multiple Congresses in what follows.
These data provide a unique perspective on Senate procedural bargaining. The UCA
data provide a window into how senators choose to govern themselves, how leaders are able
to manage floor proceedings, and how often members agree to limit their own options. The
comprehensive data allows exploration of the relationship between holds and UCAs, how
UCAs actually affect the passage of legislation, and possibilities for why this relationship
exists. This chapter pursues three goals: (1) understand the distribution of UCAs within a
Congress, (2) provide a systematic analysis of the relationship between UCAs, holds, and
the passage of legislation in the Senate, and (3) explore how leaders may view floor control
in a more systematic fashion.
3.1 UCA History and Purpose
Unanimous Consent Agreements are among the most utilized leadership tool to manage
the floor. Simply stated, UCAs are any agreement negotiated by leadership and approved
by the membership which governs some aspect of floor procedure. While widely used,
instances of unanimous consent are not identical to one another in both form and func-
tion. The most general, and common, form are simple unanimous consent requests. These
appear as members requesting permission of the Senate to take an action, either for their
individual needs or to move business through the Senate. Many motions to proceed to con-
sider bills fit into this category, with chamber or bill leaders simply stating their intention
to move to new legislation if no objection appears. Pending the lack of objection, the Sen-
ate moves to consider the new bill “by unanimous consent.” Second, simple unanimous
consent agreements manage procedure for individual bills. These agreements are agreed to
by leaders and membership, and written down to formalize the agreement, but cover un-
controversial consideration elements. These simple UCAs are often used to dispense with
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the third reading of a bill, consider a group of unobjected bills en bloc, or add cospon-
sors to a bill during consideration and change votes after the outcome has been announced.
Third, complex Unanimous Consent Agreements manage the content of deliberation over
bills. These agreements, like simple UCAs, are formalized negotiations between leaders
and agreed to by members recorded in the Congressional Record and Senate Journal. What
distinguishes these two types of UCAs is that complex UCAs control not only general pro-
cedure but the details of how bills are debated and what is in order on the floor itself (Smith
2014).
These agreements have been used to structure floor proceedings since the mid-1800s
(Roberts and Smith 2007). UCAs were seen as a means to circumvent attrition-based bar-
gaining, wherein a senator or group of senators would hold the floor until winning or los-
ing. Deliberation could be dealt with in off-floor negotiations, leaving time on the floor to
move legislation through the chamber. The increasing size of both the Senate and govern-
ment as a whole, along with rising individualism in the chamber, pushed leaders to begin
routinely managing legislation through these bargained consent agreements rather than on-
floor debate (Wawro and Schickler 2006). While the specific origins of these agreements
are murky, most observers note increased usage of these agreements in the 20th century,
particularly the 1960s and 1970s (Taylor 2012; Smith 2014).
With the increased usage of UCAs came a change in their role in the legislative process,
particularly for complex UCAs (Oleszek 2013). Complex UCAs stand apart from basic
consent requests or simple UCAs in that they seek to manage how bills are debated on the
floor or what is allowed to be presented. Thus, while simple UCAs may cover such actions
as reading a bill the third time or referring a bill to committee, complex UCAs dictate how
much time is allotted for debate and what amendments are in order on the floor. Originally
used as a means to gather consent for bills as a whole, these complex agreements have
become a means through which leaders and members carve out individual components of
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legislation. Smith (2014) shows that complex UCA usage in the early 20th century centered
around setting general limits for amendments with minimal mention of individual amend-
ments or motions, late 20th century complex UCAs have almost exclusively functioned as
a means through which to manage individual parts of deliberation (62-63). Leaders desire
to manage an increasingly disruptive and busy chamber, and governing consideration is a
means to accomplish this task (Oppenheimer 1985).
Central to academic attention to these changing complex agreements has been the ques-
tion of who benefits from their usage. While UCAs are negotiated by leaders and agreed to
by members, they may have unequal benefits for members and leaders. Smith and Flath-
man (1989) make the case that the increasing specialization of complex UCAs benefits
members, as they bargain with leaders over the content of these agreements due to their
ability to object if not appeased. This allows members to carve out policy concessions
through debate and amendments at the expense of leaders. Senators indicate a variety
of incentives for placing holds when they communicate with leaders, including outright
stoppage, amendment offerings, and notification (Howard and Roberts 2015; Evans and
Lipinski 2005, N.d.). The specific desires members state in their threats to obstruct can
force leaders to adapt policy consideration to account for potential on-floor obstruction and
filibusters.
However, Ainsworth and Flathman (1995) demonstrate that these targeted complex
UCAs may actually be a leadership tool. Leaders are better able to limit individual mem-
bers’ abilities to object through writing these specific complex UCAs, taking away indi-
vidual senators’ power granted through floor rules (Taylor 2012). These agreements lower
members’ ability to object, as upon agreeing to a UCA they are bound by its provisions.
This lowers the perceived threat of obstruction through filibusters, with members bound
to time agreements and amendment limits as in the example above (Koger 2010; Binder
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and Smith 1997; Binder 1997). Additionally, the Senate majority party has a fundamen-
tal advantage in scheduling procedures, both for bills and amendments (Krehbiel 1993;
Den Hartog and Monroe 2011). Senators may be members of procedural teams, but the
advantages given to the majority party cannot be ignored (Lee 2009). The ability of party
leaders to limit member obstruction, and the advantage of the majority party, may severely
limit the ability of members to obstruct as individuals on the floor.
To unpack this puzzle, we should explore both the actions of individual members and
instances of control by leaders. While previous work has demonstrated broad patterns for
complex UCA usage, which I build on here, there has been little focus on the bill level.
Patterns of usage and general statements about changes across time are valuable, but tell us
remarkably little about how management efforts affect individual legislation. While Smith
(2014) makes a convincing case for changing complex UCA features and Ainsworth and
Flathman (1995) demonstrate the existence of equilibrium offerings by leaders, these stud-
ies tell us little about how these tools are used and what difference they make in outcomes.
If the ultimate goal for scholars researching the connection between Senate rules and
the policy process is to understand how these rules and their usage affect the path of bills
through the chamber, then the connection between rules, usage, and outcomes for individ-
ual bills is important. Exploring why individual bills have complex UCAs while others do
not can tell us not only why leaders craft general types of agreements, but more importantly
how leaders see the connection between individual bills and their available tools. Thus, to
move beyond the general distribution of consent agreements and understand what complex
UCAs imply for members, leaders, and legislation scholars should begin exploring the
tools used on individual bills. Focusing on when complex UCAs are utilized on individual
bills, and the effects these agreements have outcomes, is necessary to fully realize what
management efforts mean for the chamber.
41
3.2 UCAs in Senate Procedure
The discussion above makes clear that using UCAs requires negotiating between numer-
ous actors within the Senate. Both party leaders must agree to the UCA, followed by all
senators – including bill sponsors, opposition partisans, and other institutionally powerful
individuals. Additionally, leaders will only utilize UCAs after bills have been reported
from committee and placed on the calendar.5 Figure 3.1 reintroduces the process tree from
Chapter 2, focusing on the decision leaders face when negotiating complex UCAs.
After bills are reported from committee and held – or not – leaders choose how to react
to the actions of members and their specific threat.6 If members threaten a hold, leaders face
three options. First, leaders can pull the bill from the calendar if they believe that the bill
will fail or consume too much time, effectively guaranteeing no chance of passage. Second,
leaders can attempt to work with members in order to manage consideration on the floor
through guaranteeing the ability to present amendments on the floor or make procedural
motions. Finally, leaders can choose to not accommodate members and either attempt
to gain consent to proceed in spite of the objection or place the bill on the floor without
unanimous consent. On bills with no observed holds, leaders should either negotiate a
UCA or proceed to consider the bill on the floor without going through the process of
gaining consent. The box in Figure 3.1 shows where in the process leaders offer complex
UCAs. After leaders respond and bills are presented on the floor, members choose to object
or not and the bill passes or not.
Clear in the depiction of obstruction in Figure 3.1 is that using complex UCAs has
numerous strategic elements. Leaders must access both the initial presence of obstruction
5Bills can also be placed directly on the calendar. This happens rarely for Senate originated bills, but is
more common for House legislation. In the discussion and analysis to follow I will focus on Senate originate
bills considered in committees, but acknowledge the complications in the process.
6Important to note is that I assume here holds and the individual components of UCAs occur on a bill-by-
bill basis. A UCA, like a hold letter, can relate to more than one piece of legislation, but I assume here that
each component is separately negotiated. Thus, while I acknowledge that this process occurs simultaneously
across bills, the integrity of the process is preserved when exploring on a bill-by-bill basis.
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Figure 3.1: Process of Obstruction: UCAs
Bill Introduced
Committee Referral
Report
Hold
Pull Bill Accommodate
Obstruct Not
Not Accommodate
Obstruct Not
No Hold
Proceed
Obstruct Not
Not
and the likelihood that a senator will follow through on her threat. They must also look at
the probability that a bill will pass the floor, and if concessions to potentially obstructing
senators will undermine the possibility of passage. Broad based support for legislation
may also push leaders to schedule legislation, despite potential obstruction (Kessler and
Krehbiel 1996; Krehbiel 1998). Similarly, leaders must look at both Congress’ institutional
and political circumstance to gauge if the potential for obstruction is worth risking potential
delay.
Where I will focus in this chapter are the decision points outlined by the blue box in
Figure 3.1. At this stage leaders can take three actions. They can either pull the bill from
the floor, put the bill forward without a consent request, or work with members to develop
a managing UCA. My interest lies in the decisions of the Senate to manage itself, and how
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the actions of members shape the availability of leadership tools. Thus, the questions here
are if holds affect efforts at gaining unanimous consent requests, and if gaining consent
leads to higher passage probability for bills.
3.3 Leadership Cues and Complex UCAs
Senate floor debate is often an acrimonious and unwieldy process. Chamber rules pro-
vide relatively few restrictions for consideration, as bills can be debated endlessly by sena-
tors allowed to speak on any subject. Every senator, leaders and rank-and-file alike, know
this possibility exists. While members may desire to either pass or kill legislation, a leader’s
goals are more complex. Leaders desire not only to pass favored legislation, but also control
the floor generally and move legislation through the chamber by expediting consideration.
The ability for leadership to manage the chamber lies in the information available to
leaders. Leaders do possess public information about the bill. This includes the content
of the legislation, which committees considered the bill, how well-supported the bill is
within the chamber, who sponsored the bill, among other features of both the bill and
institution. This information cannot be ignored by leaders, as they may face pressure from
both membership and the general public to bring certain bills to the floor. The bill content
and which committee considers legislation may force leaders to take action on legislation.
Institutionally powerful members can also pressure leaders to take action on legislation or
face consequences.
The most important public information for the leadership’s decision to work toward
consideration for a bill is the potential level of support within the chamber. Bills which
are well-supported with higher numbers of cosponsors may be pushed more heavily by the
membership. Leaders, desiring to protect their fellow partisans, will push for consideration
of these bills in order to protect their partisan interests electorally. Cosponsors are also
important in that these bills will likely face less resistance for complex UCAs, incentivizing
leaders to push these bills in an effort for the chamber to appear productive. While some
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bills may be deemed more important or potentially impactful, legislative productivity has
an electoral payoff as well.
Cosponsors are not the only signal of potential support within the chamber, however.
Leaders are aware of the procedural advantages for the majority, and that majority members
are better able to provide institutional benefits. While senators may often act as members
of procedural teams, scheduling advantages for majority partisans abound. Majority legis-
lation is more likely to be reported from committee, have amendments considered on the
floor, and pass procedural votes. Leaders and other members are aware of these advantages,
and while they may not favor the underlying legislation they will be more likely to proceed
with the legislation.
Leaders are thus aware of this public information when bills are reported from com-
mittee, and view bills accordingly. Yet, leaders face a serious problem in managing the
chamber even with this public information. While not every senator will object to a bill,
and a senator will not object to every bill, on-floor obstruction can still disrupt deliberation.
Furthermore, each member’s potential objection to legislation is private information avail-
able only to that senator an overwhelming percentage of the time. Leaders are not aware of
potential member objection when bills are reported from committee, as only public infor-
mation is available to leaders when initially evaluating bills.
Chamber leaders desire this private information. Legislation can fail without it, as
members obstruct floor proceedings in order to kill the legislation with no prior warning for
leaders. Deciding which bills to put forward becomes a choice less fraught with potential
failure if this information is available, as they can incorporate it and make better decisions.
This need to gain access to private information and incorporate it into decision making
pushes leaders to develop a means through which they can obtain it.
The Senate has developed holds, a means through which leaders can gain access to this
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private information prior to floor consideration. Holds provide a means through which lead-
ers can evaluate potential objection by specific, individual senators before debate ever oc-
curs. Moreover, holds allow leaders access to often itemized demands by members before
crafting UCAs. John Ashcroft (R-MO) provides an example when he informed Majority
Leader Robert Dole (KS) that:
“As I wish to pursue my intention to offer Section 312 as an amendment to the
bill [S. 1180] on the floor, I will object to any time agreement or unanimous
consent request with respect to consideration of S. 1180, Calendar Order Num-
ber 292, an Act which amends title XIX of the Public Health Service Act to
provide for health performance partnership, and for other purposes.”
While Ashcroft threatens to object to any unanimous consent request on this bill, he makes
Dole aware of potential objection and obstruction. That is, Ashcroft provides Dole with
private information about potential obstruction prior to floor debate. Importantly, Ashcroft
also provides Dole a means through which he can be appeased. This information can be uti-
lized by Dole when attempting to gain consent through working guaranteed consideration
of the substitute amendment into a complex UCA.
Leaders value expedited legislative consideration, and will make widespread use of the
information provided to them through holds. Working with member demands to craft com-
plex UCA provisions guaranteeing floor time, the ability to offer an amendment, or block-
ing the ability of others to offer amendments becomes far easier with this new information.
Additionally, gaining unanimous consent will be far easier with senators guaranteed con-
sideration of their potential problems with legislation. The potential to be guaranteed the
opportunity to offer their amendments, or speak about the bill under consideration, pro-
vides a strong incentive for members to agree to binding their ability to object on the floor.
Chamber leaders know this, and will develop agreements governing the floor based on this
private information now made available to them.
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Beyond leadership incentives for inclusion of threats in UCAs, this provides incen-
tives for members to register their objection with party leaders prior to floor consideration.
Members gain a guaranteed opportunity to gain access to the floor rather than relying on
the chaotic Senate recognition system. Senators will utilize this UCA system put in place
by leaders to further their own interests, giving off-floor processes power over on-floor con-
sideration. This means that complex UCAs should not only respond to public information,
but should also respond to revealed private information made available through holds.
That UCAs provide advantages to both members and leaders has definitive connotations
for passage. These agreements, written by leaders to expedite floor consideration by ap-
peasing potential member objections, provide for bills to be considered on the floor. Given
the Senate’s agenda and the overwhelming crush of business, this eases one of the most
difficult hurdles for passage. While a complex UCA should by no means guarantee Senate
passage for a bill, floor consideration and control over debate makes passage much more
likely. Using complex UCAs provides members advantages, but it greatly eases the ability
of leaders to guide legislation through the chamber. This theory leads to three hypotheses
about when bills should receive complex UCAs and how they effect passage.
Hypothesis 1: Bills with observed holds will be more likely to have complex UCAs utilized
Hypothesis 2: Bills with wider support, measured through more cosponsors and a majority
party sponsor, will be more likely to have complex UCAs utilized.
Hypothesis 3: Bills with complex UCAs will be more likely to pass the chamber.
3.4 Data
The data presented here is based on complex UCAs listings in the Senate Journal for the
99th Congress.7 As discussed earlier, I define a complex UCA as any agreement among
7As discussed earlier, I have holds data for the 95th, 97th, and 99-104th Congresses, and amendment
data for the 101st-104th Congresses (Howard and Roberts 2015; Evans and Lipinski 2005; Den Hartog and
Monroe 2011). Thus future iterations will cover large portions of this time period. Due to constraints from
coding resources and time I choose to focus on the 99th, in which Republicans give a broad spread of goals
and motivations when placing holds with Majority Leader Dole.
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all 100 senators which controls either general or specific elements of floor consideration.
These agreements occur after committee consideration and before passage. What falls out-
side of complex UCAs are general consent requests and simple UCAs doing away with
simple procedural hurdles. Thus, formal UCAs concerning referrals to committees and
third readings of bills do not qualify as complex. Additionally, general orders for recogni-
tion do not apply to legislation and thus are not counted among these complex UCAs. These
commonly occur near the end of a day’s session, setting the time for routine business and
who will be recognized to give remarks opening the next day.8
Table 3.1 provides an overview of complex UCA content in the 99th Congress. This
table includes all complex UCAs in the 99th Congress on all bills. Thus, the percentages
listed in column 2 of Table 3.1 are an overall picture of bargaining over legislative proce-
dure in the Senate in 1985 and 1986. Apparent in this table is that many complex UCAs
targeted specific amendments, with over 20% making allowances for amendment consid-
eration in some form. 16.81% limit the time available for specific amendments, which
involves providing time allotments for considering a certain amendment. This often ap-
pears as a given time limit with the available time controlled by certain senators. 6.06% of
complex UCAs dictate that only the amendments outlined in the UCA will be in order on
the floor, while 15.96% provide for consideration of amendments without banning others.
Second degree amendments and procedural motions were a consistent target in the 99th
Congress. 6.38% of complex UCAs banned second degree amendments, while 5.43%
removed the ability for the chamber to recommit the bill to committee. Banning amend-
ments outright was rare in the 99th Congress, with only 1.7% of all complex UCAs banned
amendments outright. This implies that these agreements were written with the purpose of
appeasing members and easing consideration for Majority Leader Dole (R-KS) and Minor-
ity Leader Byrd (D-WV).
8Where these may be of interest is the question of setting a given day’s agenda, but that falls outside the
question presented in this dissertation.
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Table 3.1: Specific Provisions Within Complex UCAs – 99th Congress
Provision Percentage of UCAS
Specific Amendment Time Limits 16.81
Motion Time Limit 2.34
Measure Time Limit 8.09
Not Amendment Restrictive 15.96
Amendment Restrictive 6.06
No Second Degree 6.38
No Motion to Recommit 5.43
No Motion to Table 2.23
Bar All Amendments 1.7
Total UCAs 940
Table 3.1 outlines the distribution of complex UCAs on all legislation, but the primary
interest in this study is on Senate originated legislation. Thus, the question remains for
how these complex UCAs are used on individual legislation. Focusing on bills, Table
3.2 presents complex UCA usage in the 99th Congress on Senate originated, “S” type
legislation. One startlingly clear conclusion from Table 3.2 is that complex UCAs are not
uncommon, but are not used on all legislation. The first category in Table 3.2 includes any
complex UCA, from control over amendments to setting the order in which amendments
are considered and indefinite postponement of legislation. Of all Senate legislation reported
from committee, 22.74% receive any type of complex UCA.
UCAs that explicitly control content and consideration – rows 2 and 3 in Table 3.2 –
are used on approximately 1 in 8 Senate originated bills. These two categories are of pri-
mary interest, in that they represent leaders and membership working together to manage
the content and deliberation of legislation. These categories do not include amendment or-
dering and indefinite postponement UCAs, but rather deal exclusively with what is allowed
to be offered on the floor. The second category in Table 3.2 is any UCA – Non-Sequential
Ordering – represents the percentage of bills on which complex UCAs that did not deal
with the order on which amendments were considered or bills set aside were used. These
are agreements such as the May 24, 1985 complex UCA for S. 1160 introduced by Dole.
49
This complex UCA detailed a set of amendments which would be the only amendments in
order on the floor and placed limits on what second degree amendments would be in order
to be offered.9
The third category for complex UCAs – Content Management Only – represents a sub-
set of the Non-Sequential Ordering category. A possibility from Table 3.1 is that all of the
complex UCAs relating to amendment management are utilized on only a select number
of bills. What is clear is that the two categories are almost identical in usage. Content
Managing UCAs are used on 12.66% of Senate legislation, almost perfectly matching the
Non-Sequential Ordering usage. Complex UCAs which provide control for debate outside
of setting the sequence for consideration of amendments and bills almost entirely deal with
the managing the content of legislative debate. Given the theory above, these complex
UCAs should be most directly linked to the prior hold behavior of members.
Senate bills considered under different types of complex UCAs may have different
debate patterns and different outcome possibilities. These differences may shape both how
complex UCAs are utilized and affect passage in the Senate. This distinction between the
content of complex UCAs and how they affect consideration will be utilized in the analyses
to follow below. Limiting the analysis by separating different ordering UCAs – those which
provide for indefinite postponement for bills – will be informative for how UCAs manage
the chamber.
Table 3.2: Complex UCAs on Senate Bills – 99th Congress
Complex UCA Type Percentage of Bills
Any Complex UCA 22.74
Non-Sequential Ordering 12.92
Content Managing Only 12.66
Number of Bills 370
9Further complex UCAs on this bill also set time limits for debate and voting on each amendment at later
dates.
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Additionally, I utilize the dataset of holds featured in Chapter 2. These holds were gath-
ered at the Robert J. Dole Institute of Politics in Lawrence, KS, and are from Republicans
under the leadership of Robert Dole (R-KS) in his time as Senate party leader, which in-
cludes the 99th Congress. Thus the data relating to the presence or absence of holds relates
only to Republicans. This may temper the interpretation of majority status, as I do not
have bills on which there are both majority and minority holds to compare to single party
holds. While I acknowledge this limitation, the data provide the only available window into
procedural bargaining in the Senate.10
The unit of observation here is the bill, not the complex UCA itself. Thus, the statistical
tests below are focused if complex UCAs are utilized on bills, rather than on the specific
provisions of complex UCAs themselves.11 I limit myself to Senate originated legislation,
both due to the nature of the data available and that these bills are almost always considered
in Senate committees. This allows me to follow the path presented in Figure 3.1, and only
look at Senate originated legislation which has been reported out of committee. Thus, the
observations in the analysis to follow have all followed the same path. This eases concerns
about the different path House bills follow through the Senate, where the Senate has a far
more varied treatment of legislation.
Leaders do not create and manage debate through complex UCAs in isolation, but rather
must carefully bargain with members over the content of floor deliberation itself. Captur-
ing this process requires accounting for numerous institutional and bill-specific variables,
as these may have an effect on complex UCA usage and bill passage. I utilize a number of
controls for bill sponsors, in an attempt to parse out the effects of who writes a bill on if
holds effect complex UCA usage. Sponsor Ideological Extremity measures the ideological
10I have attempted to gather similar data from Democrats under the leadership of George Mitchell (ME)
at his archive. This data was not present in his Senate papers, so no comparable data exists for Democrats at
this time.
11E. Scott Adler and John Wilkerson, Congressional Bills Project: 1985-1986, NSF 00880066 and
00880061
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difference between a bill sponsor’s DW-NOMINATE and a perfect median score of zero.
Thus, this is simply a measure of a bill sponsor’s ideological extremity, and helps to control
for confounding effects in Majority Sponsor. Sponsor Seniority measures the number of
Congresses in which a bill sponsor has served, and Committee Leader Sponsor refers to a
bill sponsor’s committee chair or ranking member status. I also utilize three bill specific
variables,Months Remaining, Policy Committee, andMultiple Referral. Months Remaining
is a count of months between bill introduction and the end of a Congress. Policy Committee
indicates if a bill was considered in a high-profile, policy oriented committee, whileMulti-
ple Referral indicates whether a bill was considered in two or more committees rather than
a single committee.12
3.5 Analysis
The discussion above provides several predictions for complex UCA usage on leg-
islation, and Table 3.3 contains models for their usage. Table 3.3 presents two logistic
regression models, each with a dependent variable of a non-sequential ordering complex
UCAs on Senate legislation reported from committee.13 That is, the dependent variable
is the presence or absence of a UCA falling into the second complex UCA type in Table
3.2. Apparent in Table 3.3 is the general lack of statistically significant effects in predicting
the usage of complex UCAs on legislation. The presence of a hold on legislation does not
predict the usage of UCAs in a statistically significant fashion. This goes against the ex-
pectation in Hypothesis 1, which is that a held bill should be more likely to have a complex
UCA. The usage of a Republican hold on a bill in the 99th Congress does not appear to
have any effect on the usage of complex UCAs on those bills.
Senators state differing intentions when placing holds, however. While the Ashcroft
12Policy committees in Deering and Smith (1997) are: Budget, Foreign Relations, Governmental Affairs,
Judiciary, and Labor. Several studies have utilized a similar approach to generating categories of committees,
including Fenno (1973).
13I do not consider in this paper multiple complex UCAs on the same bill, but rather focus on their use on
legislation.
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Table 3.3: Usage of Complex UCAs on Bills – 99th Congress
Variable Model 1 Model 2
Held Bill 0.135 -
(0.379) -
Killer Held Only - 0.500
- (0.716)
Cosponsors 0.067⇤ 0.067⇤
(0.033) (0.032)
Majority Sponsor 3.005⇤ 2.981⇤
(1.275) (1.266)
Cosponsors * Majority Spsonsor -0.062 -0.061
(0.035) (0.035)
Sponsor Ideological Extremity 0.053 0.094
(0.907) (0.912)
Months Remaining 0.015 0.014
(0.026) (0.027)
Policy Committee 0.238 0.247
(0.323) (0.322)
Multiple Referral 0.884 0.871
(0.570) (0.569)
Sponsor Seniority -0.019 -0.017
(0.045) (0.046)
Committee Leader Sponsor 0.329 0.309
(0.380) (0.382)
Intercept -5.290⇤ -5.261⇤
(1.390) (1.379)
N 370 370
Log-likelihood -135.839 -135.673
 2(10) 17.65 17.98
Note: Estimates are from an logistic regression model. The dependent variable is coded 1 if the bill received
a complex UCA and 0 if it did not. Standard errors in parentheses. ⇤ = p  0.05.
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example above provides specific information to leaders which can be used to appease the
holding senator, other holds simply desire to kill the bill. Thus, these holds without bar-
gaining information may be confounding the results in Model 1. Bills targeted by killer
holds may be less likely to receive complex UCAs, as leaders have access to relatively little
private information with which to appease members and only have access to the filibuster
threat. This provides a potential contrary, consideration prevention oriented, mechanism
for killer holds. If leaders value the content of private information to expedite considera-
tion, killer holds should lead to a decreased likelihood for complex UCAs. This potential
confounding mechanism is also not confirmed. That is, if complex UCAs were a strictly
bargaining and expediting tool we would expect to see a statistically significant negative re-
lationship between killer holds and complex UCAs in Table 3.3’s Model 2. No statistically
significant relationship exists, and the coefficient does not change for these holds.
Increasing support within the chamber does make complex UCAs more likely on legis-
lation, however. As the number of cosponsors on a bill increases, complex UCAs become
more likely on that bill. Bills on which leaders see greater public support among senators
are more likely to have UCAs. Additionally, bills sponsored by a member of the majority
party are more likely to have complex UCAs. The interactive effect between these two vari-
ables does not have a statistically significant effect, but should be taken into consideration
when drawing inferences for complex UCA usage. In short, greater potential underlying
support for the legislation increases the likelihood that complex UCAs are utilized to con-
trol and limit debate. Leaders respond to publicly available information, and work to craft
complex UCAs on these bills with a greater degree of public support. These results lend
support to Hypothesis 2.
Interestingly, I find no other statistically significant effects on the usage of complex
UCAs for either model in Table 3.3. The details of the bill sponsor do not have any effect,
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nor does the time remaining upon bill introduction or where bills were considered in com-
mittee. While some of these effects are theoretically unexpected, this could be due to the
sample occurring in only one Congress.
The details in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 present a possible explanation for these results, how-
ever. Table 3.2 demonstrates that there are several bills which receive scheduling complex
UCAs, but no other complex UCA. Additionally, Table 3.1 demonstrates that complex
UCAs can be targeted at certain elements of discussion and scheduling while leaving oth-
ers untouched. One provision of complex UCAs not seen in Table 3.1 is that of indefinite
postponement, whereby the Senate agrees to set aside a bill and not consider it further.
These bills are not eligible to pass the Senate, and this ineligibility stems from a decision
of the Senate as a whole.
Table 3.4 presents a model estimated excluding those bills which received indefinite
postponement, without any other complex UCA, excluded from the data.14 These bills
included in this model are those where complex UCAs are the most likely, given that they
are not simply put aside through actions of the Senate. As in Table 3.3, no statistically
significant relationship exists betweenHold and the usage of complex UCAs in Table 3.4.15
Thus, I cannot find support for Hypothesis 1 with the data presented.
While leaders and the chamber do seem to react to public information, the creation
of complex UCAs does not respond to private information made available to leaders in
the 99th Congress. This finding most likely stems from two separate sources. First, the
data available at this time is limited to only the 99th Congress. This Congress presents a
majority Republican party with a Republican president, an institutional arrangement which
may change how complex UCAs are used. Future versions of this chapter will include
more Congresses in an effort to better assess these effects. Second, complex UCAs may
14I also estimated a model excluding all bills which received indefinite postponement UCAs. This model
did not provide different inferences than the model shown, and thus is not presented.
15The model was also estimated using only killer holds and found similar results to that in Table 3.3. The
model is not presented here for the purpose of space.
55
Table 3.4: Complex UCAs with Postponed Bills Excluded
Variable Coefficient
(Std. Err.)
Hold -0.008
(0.387)
Cosponsors 0.065⇤
(0.033)
Majority Sponsor 3.076⇤
(1.279)
Cosponsors * Majority Sponsor -0.059
(0.035)
Sponsor Ideological Extremity 0.245
(0.932)
Months Remaining 0.015
(0.027)
Policy Committee 0.245
(0.334)
Multiple Referral 1.087
(0.607)
Sponsor Seniority -0.022
(0.047)
Committee Leader Sponsor 0.398
(0.390)
Intercept -5.243⇤
(1.410)
N 321
Log-likelihood -127.861
 2(10) 18.59
Note: Estimates are from an logistic regression model. The dependent variable is coded 1 if the bill received
a complex UCA and 0 if it did not. Standard errors in parentheses. ⇤ = p  0.05.
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respond to only holds by specific senators rather than general threats. Connecting holds
and complex UCAs on a micro level may explain how leaders react to both threats from
specific members and threats from any member. Chapter 4 will engage the connection
between holds and observed floor amendments, but further work will be needed to analyze
how leaders see threats by specific senators.
3.5.1 Complex UCAs and Bill Passage
I now move from a focus on factors associated with the usage of complex UCAs to focus on
the relationship between complex UCAs and bill passage. The theory expects that complex
UCAs should make passage more likely, as they ease time concerns for consideration and
solve many potential on-floor problems before they consume floor time. I here utilize
the same covariates as in the model in Table 3.3, but add the presence or absence of a
complex UCA as a covariate.16 Table 3.5 presents logistic regressions with the passage
of a bill through the Senate as the dependent variable, and these covariates as explanatory
covariates.
Column 1 of Table 3.5 presents a model considering Complex UCAs as isolated tools,
and fails to find a statistically significant relationship between their usage and bill passage.
That is, controlling for institutional and bill-specific factors, the usage of complex UCAS
does not appear to have an effect on bill passage in the Senate. To account for the fact
that complex UCAs are part of a bargaining process with members, column 2 of Table 3.5
includes the presence of a hold on a bill. This model again finds no relationship between
the usage of complex UCAs and bill passage in the Senate, but finds a clear negative rela-
tionship between holds and bill passage. That is, the presence of a hold on a bill in the 99th
Congress statistically significantly lowers the probability of that bill passing the Senate,
while the presence of a complex UCA has no statistically significant effect. This provides
16I do not use the interaction here, as the relationship between the two covariates is less clear. I also
considered the number of complex UCAs used on a bill in this analysis. Changing the results in Table 3.5 to
include this count variable rather than a binary indicator does not change the inferences reached.
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no support for Hypothesis 3.
To attempt to unpack why I find no relationship between complex UCAs and bill pas-
sage, but a remarkably clear relationship between holds and bill passage, I return to the
discussion of different complex UCA content and usage. As discussed above, the Senate
can indefinitely postpone legislative consideration through complex UCA. These indefinite
suspensions indicate management efforts, but ultimately stop any possibility for passage.
The effect of UCAs indefinitely postponing consideration should be especially apparent for
the question of passage. Indefinitely postponing legislation through UCA gives the legisla-
tion no chance to pass the chamber, whatever information exists and past action taken. Thus
including these bills in models estimating bill passage may confound the effects manage-
ment efforts have on legislation. Table 3.6 presents models estimated for sub-categories of
all legislation, with the difference between the models being which indefinitely postponed
bills are excluded from the full dataset. Models 1 and 2 use all Senate legislation which
includes an indefinite suspension complex UCA but not a content management complex
UCA. Thus on these bills, as in Table 3.4, the Senate has suspended consideration but not
taken prior efforts to manage content. Models 3 and 4 exclude any bill which received an
indefinite postponement complex UCA, regardless of other content management efforts on
the legislation.
Models 1 and 2 in Table 3.6 utilize bills which did not exclusively feature an indefinite
postponement UCA. This sub-sample includes the same observations as Table 3.4. This
leaves some bills which were indefinitely postponed, but were the target of other complex
UCAs. Similar to the results in Table 3.5, I find no statistically significant relationship
between complex UCAs and passage in either column. Also similar to Model 2 in Table
3.5, I find a statistically significant negative relationship between the incidence of holds
and passage.
The last two columns of Table 3.6 present a different story, however. These two columns
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Table 3.5: Bill Passage in the Senate – 99th Congress
Variable Model 1 Model 2
Complex UCA 0.404 0.472
(0.331) (0.345)
Held Bill – -1.374⇤
– (0.317)
Sponsor Ideological Extremity -0.326 -0.355
(0.620) (0.639)
Months Remaining 0.047⇤ 0.053⇤
(0.018) (0.019)
Policy Committee -0.428 -0.340
(0.227) (0.235)
Multiple Referral -2.269⇤ -2.095⇤
(0.651) (0.662)
Sponsor Seniority 0.009 0.004
(0.032) (0.033)
Committee Leader Sponsor -0.366 -0.240
(0.260) (0.270)
Majority Sponsor -0.689⇤ -0.691⇤
(0.309) (0.321)
Cosponsors 0.004 0.011
(0.009) (0.010)
Intercept 0.276 0.311
(0.467) (0.479)
N 370 370
Log-likelihood -238.783 -228.276
 2(9) 35.32 56.333
Note: Estimates are from an logistic regression model. The dependent variable is coded 1 if the bill passed
the Senate and 0 if it did not. Standard errors in parentheses. ⇤ = p  0.05.
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Table 3.6: Bill Passage With Postponed Bills Excluded
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Complex UCA 0.053 0.092 1.276⇤ 1.207⇤
(0.339) (0.358) (0.493) (0.505)
Hold - -1.659⇤ - -1.614⇤
- (0.333) - (0.348)
Cosponsors 0.024 0.033 0.019 0.029
(0.028) (0.034) (0.029) (0.034)
Majority Sponsor -0.505 -0.546 -0.511 -0.542
(0.421) (0.450) (0.423) (0.449)
Cosponsors * Majority Sponsor -0.022 -0.025 -0.017 -0.020
(0.030) (0.035) (0.031) (0.036)
Sponsor Ideological Extremity -0.278 -0.264 -0.178 -0.289
(0.682) (0.716) (0.723) (0.755)
Months Remaining 0.052⇤ 0.062⇤ 0.053⇤ 0.064⇤
(0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022)
Policy Committee -0.487 -0.299 -0.398 -0.164
(0.249) (0.264) (0.260) (0.276)
Multiple Referral -2.454⇤ -2.196⇤ -2.269⇤ -1.942⇤
(0.678) (0.693) (0.701) (0.736)
Sponsor Seniority 0.006 -0.002 0.007 -0.001
(0.678) (0.037) (0.036) (0.038)
Committee Leader Sponsor -0.466 -0.336 -0.449 -0.295
(0.288) (0.303) (0.299) (0.314)
Intercept 0.485 0.544 0.388 0.412
(0.563) (0.593) (0.579) (0.601)
N 321 321 304 304
Log-likelihood -201.303 -199.930 -186.800 -175.090
 2(9) 36.62 39.36 35.91 59.33
Note: Estimates are from an logistic regression model. The dependent variable is coded 1 if the bill passed
the Senate and 0 if it did not. Standard errors in parentheses. ⇤ = p  0.05.
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exclude any bill receiving an indefinite postponement UCA, regardless of other action on
the bill. Thus, these are the bills with a chance to pass the Senate taking into account the
actions of the united floor to stop passage. Model 3 in Table 3.6 demonstrates that for these
bills complex UCAs do positively predict passage. Thus, for bills reported from committee
which the Senate has not indefinitely set aside there is a positive and statistically significant
relationship between their usage and bill passage. Column 4 includes the presence of holds
into this model. When holds are included in this model’s estimation, they retain the neg-
ative and statistically significant relationship with passage seen in all previous models in
Tables 3.5 and 3.6. In spite of this negative relationship between private objection and pas-
sage, complex UCAs maintain their positive and statistically significant effect from Model
3. Thus for legislation not indefinitely postponed by collective chamber action, complex
UCAs do relate to passage.
These results demonstrate that some relationship exists between complex UCAs and
bill passage in the Senate. When exploring legislation introduced in the Senate, the usage
of complex UCAs can affect passage through the chamber, but much of this effect depends
upon the data considered. That the models for any expanded set of observations beyond
those without indefinite suspension show no results weakens the support for Hypothesis
3, but the support remains. Complex UCAs do appear to in practice be some form of
leadership tool to ease consideration and passage, even when including private information
presented to leaders through holds in the model estimation.
3.6 Discussion
This chapter provides an initial exploration of complex Unanimous Consent Agreements
and their effect on legislative outcomes. While the data has shortcomings due to the lack
of multiple Congresses, it still provides among the first statistical treatment of these UCAs.
My analysis reveals that the level of support within the chamber is tied to the usage of
these agreements, both in terms of cosponsors for a bill and the majority status of the bill
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sponsor. Public information about bill support leads to increased probability for UCA use.
I fail to find a relationship between holds and complex UCAs, a surprising result given the
expectation that leaders will use this private information to craft agreements designed to bill
management on the floor. I do, however, hesitate to conclude that no relationship exists.
The data does suggest that the relationship between these two procedural mechanisms may
be weaker than my theory, and much of the existing literature, expects.
My findings also speak to the complicated relationship between complex UCAs and
passage procedure. I fail to find any relationship between the usage of a complex UCA and
a bill passing the Senate when exploring all Senate bills, even when holding constant the
presence of privately related objection through holds on bills. However, when parsing bills
eligible for passage by the end of their consideration I do find a strong positive relationship.
Bills which have not been set aside by the Senate and are targeted by complex UCAs
are more likely to pass the Senate than those which do not have complex UCAs. This
provides some evidence that complex UCAs may be a leadership tool to ease consideration
and eventual passage. While leaders may not respond to specific member threats through
holds, negotiating complex UCAs controlling content does provide leaders with benefits
for managing the chamber and eventual passage.
Even with the strongly positive relationship between complex UCAs and passage present
in columns 3 and 4 of Table 3.6, the negative effect for holds from Chapter 2 survives. Thus,
this chapter makes clear that the information and tools available to both members and lead-
ers have power over outcomes and passage. While it appears that complex UCAs may
provide leaders with advantages over members to some degree, this should not be taken
as leaders rescinding member capacities to affect outcomes. Complex UCAs may simply
be tool with which leaders can funnel member objections through widely supported legis-
lation. Additionally, these agreements may only appear through some mechanism which
does not appear in this chapter.
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The lacking connection between information given to leaders about private objection
and complex UCAs brings to the forefront questions of how leaders view threats to legis-
lation. Chapter 2 demonstrates that holds are predictable and effect passage, but even with
these potentially powerful effects leaders do not seem to respond to threats through man-
agement efforts. The question remaining in this dissertation is how member threats affect
floor proceedings, and if leaders do not respond to member threats due to floor behavior. To
attempt a resolution of this question, the next chapter turns to the connections between off-
and on-floor objection, and how leaders may attempt to manage objection and deliberation
in public.
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4 LINKING PUBLIC AND PRIVATE OBSTRUCTION: FILIBUSTERS
Observers often depict the Senate floor as one lone senator railing against the force
of a majority, willing her policy stances and individual preferences to be heard before
succumbing to exhaustion and the limits of human endurance. Examples of these, including
Strom Thurmond’s filibuster of the 1957 Civil Rights bill, are among the most famous
parliamentary debate moments in American history. Other times, filibusters can be a block
of senators protecting their own interests by working together to hold the floor and stop
passage of a bill. Indeed, senators are prone to seeing the filibuster in this fashion when
it protects their own interests. Robert Byrd echoed this when stating that there can be a
“casual, gentlemanly, good-guy filibuster. . . . Everybody goes home and gets a good
night’s sleep and everybody protects everybody else.1” Scholars, while moderating these
extraordinary cases, often depict the floor as requiring 60 votes to proceed on any bill
(Krehbiel 1998). Portrayed in this case as a serious obstacle to general proceedings, this
threshold causes proponents and leaders to modify legislation or face its defeat.
This chapter is an attempt to place the filibuster, and these characterizations of its usage
and intent, into a broader context for members and leaders. While in some cases filibusters
may be a senator surprising leaders by engaging in unlimited, no-holds-barred attempts to
kill legislation, this chapter posits that filibusters and other on-floor tactics are far more
often part of a larger obstructive strategy. Filibusters often appear to the public as senators
willing their views to be heard, but I make the case that far more often these filibusters
are the end of senators presenting objection to leaders throughout the process. Chapter 2
1Quoted in Yang, John. “Fili-bluster; Has the Senate Marathon Seen Its Day?” Washington Post. January
16, 2005. B1.
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demonstrated that senators place holds on a variety of legislation, and these holds should
here be linked to incidences of filibusters. Leaders understand this possible objection exists,
and may unequally target majority party legislation, but also realize the procedural hurdles
bills considered on the floor have already overcome (Den Hartog and Monroe 2011). This
chapter argues that understanding how members see filibusters and amendments within
their procedural tool chest, and how these on-floor tactics are linked to off-floor actions,
should inform how leaders react to proposals and threats.
The remainder of this chapter will focus on two elements. First, I explore why an in-
dividual bill may be threatened with a filibuster. I will focus on how this relates to the
presence of previous threatened objection, and what this reveals about the nature of fili-
busters and obstruction more broadly. Second, I attempt to unpack why leaders react in the
fashion they do to filibusters and threats. This chapter ties together the previous two chap-
ters to establish a picture of why obstruction works as it does, both from members making
threats and leaders reacting – or not – to those same revealed threats.
4.1 Origin and Use of the Modern Filibuster
In the procedural bargaining story that began this dissertation, I stated several assertions
about members and leaders. First, members know their own interests and are aware of the
circumstances under which a bill is considered. This means that members will actively
work to protect their own interests, and this action will be most likely when their interests
are directly threatened through legislation. Thus a cost of doing business in the Senate is
understanding the varied interests of current senators and what they are likely to obstruct.
Critical to the import of this evaluation is that I am not looking directly at members
choosing to obstruct and how much they obstruct. Rather, I am exploring how legislation
moves through the Senate, along with where obstruction occurs and how this obstruction
affects Senate consideration. Thus I do not focus on the specifics of which individuals may
be more likely to utilize filibusters and amendments in this chapter (Bell 2011; Overby and
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Bell 2004). Neither do I focus on senators’ electoral situations and how this may alter their
public actions (Patty N.d.). Rather, I am interested in the institutional setup under which
bills are considered, where senators and bills fit within that setup, and how the existence of
multiple obstruction stages frames where filibusters are utilized.
To develop a framework for why individual bills would be filibustered, and when we
should expect to see this strategy utilized, beginning with the history of cloture is informa-
tive. Filibusters are not new to the Senate, existing since 1790 (Bell 2011). The possibility
of endless Senate filibusters is generally credited to removing the rule for previous question
motion from Senate procedure in 1806 (Binder and Smith 1997; Binder 1997).2 Increas-
ing usage of on-floor obstructive tactics led to the implementation of cloture through Rule
XXII in 1917 (Burdette 1940; Wawro and Schickler 2004). Meant to bring an end to attri-
tion filibusters and help ease an increasing Senate workload, Rule XXII allowed members
to end debate through a 2/3 vote (Wawro and Schickler 2006). Majority members, both
partisan and policy, favored this change to streamline Senate consideration (Koger 2006).
Changing usage patterns and political circumstances cause the Senate to lower this thresh-
old to a 3/5 of all members present and voting threshold in 1975 (Binder 1997, 1999). The
traditional usage of the filibuster as a tool against a limited set of legislation changed during
the intervening period, moving away from questions of civil rights to a broader spectrum
of targeted issues (Binder, Lawrence and Smith 2002).
The modern period has seen several changes from the classic period. The usage of ob-
structive measures has continued to increase over the last 40 years (Schiller 2012). Senators
obstruct a great deal of legislation, and deploy obstructive tactics frequently (Koger 2010;
Howard and Roberts 2015). This increasing obstruction has forced the Senate to react, and
often react preemptively. The number of cloture petitions have increased dramatically over
2This rule, which is used by the House to close debate on a bill, was not removed for the purpose of
allowing endless debate. Removal was due rather to its lack of usage and duplication of alternate rules which
the Senate believed were more straightforward. In fact, this new procedural landscape was not used until
almost 1840 (Binder 1997).
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the last thirty years (Bell 2011; Lee 2010). Cloture petitions have become increasingly di-
vorced from observed obstruction, with leaders often filing these petitions simultaneously
with the bill (Smith 2014). Leaders developed tactics to deal with obstruction through
debate and amendments, including expanding their usage of procedural motions to block
debate (Smith, Ostrander and Christopher 2013).
The modern filibuster is, in short, a potentially valuable weapon for members in their
pursuit of policy and political goals even though used infrequently. This said, it is not the
only tool in a member’s arsenal. Members often threaten but rarely engage in filibusters.
Chapter 2 demonstrated widespread pre-floor hold threats, with more than 15% of bills
targeted by holds, but as discussed later far fewer face on-floor filibusters. Neither are
filibusters invulnerable to leader and chamber action. Leaders actively take steps to curtail
this tactic through complex UCAs, as seen in Chapter 3, where 12% of Senate bills in
the 99th Congress received content managing agreements. Changes to obstruction stretch
beyond member usage and leader control, as filibusters also target a larger spectrum of the
Senate’s agenda than in the past (Binder and Smith 1997). No longer can filibusters be
solved by rolling civil rights legislation into a package to make it more palatable. Leaders
must be constantly aware of the possibility of obstruction.
4.1.1 Past Attention to the Filibuster
The filibuster often proves a difficult, but crucial, step to overcome in Congressional
policy making. While the filibuster has changed over the past century, it remains of piv-
otal importance to theories of American politics. Several studies place the filibuster at the
center of what it means to consider legislation in Congress. Krehbiel (1998) utilizes the
filibuster pivot to create his gridlock zones, with legislation needing overcome a potential
60-vote cloture threshold before consideration should occur (Krehbiel 1993). Chiou and
Rothenberg (2003) demonstrate that party strength alters the conclusions reached by Kre-
hbiel, shaping the gridlock zones through both individual preference and party (Chiou and
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Rothenberg 2006, 2009). The filibuster also harms general legislative productivity, with
bill sponsors and supporters forced to circumvent possible obstruction at each stage (Jones
and Baumgartner 2005). The need to constantly manage possible obstruction, both before
and during public consideration, slows Congressional proceedings and exacerbates grid-
lock (Binder 1999; Volden and Wiseman 2014; Weingast and Marshall 1988; Shepsle and
Weingast 1987, 1994; Cox and McCubbins 1994). Despite incentives to pass legislation
for reelection, the power given to individual senators slows the legislative process.
Filibuster effects stretch beyond legislation. Nominations are directly affected by the
presence of the filibuster, as only the Senate confirms nominees (Rohde and Shepsle 2007;
Primo, Binder and Maltzman 2008). Presidents must adjust their strategies around senators
and their preferences, while accounting for potential cloture fights (Johnson and Roberts
2004, 2005; Binder and Maltzman 2002, 2004, 2009). Additionally, the filibuster’s exis-
tence may provide more power to institutionally pivotal members such as committee chairs
(McCarty and Razaghian 1999). In short, the filibuster shapes all areas of Senate consider-
ation.
Filibusters affect parties as well, with the majority party’s ability to schedule and pass
legislation diminished by the filibuster. The ability for any individual or small coalition to
stop consideration undermines many potential majoritarian impulses in the chamber (Gail-
mard and Jenkins 2007; Den Hartog and Monroe 2008, 2011). This effect has potentially
become more powerful with the modern filibuster, as parties have increasingly become po-
larized teams (Lee 2009; Poole and Rosenthal 2007; Binder and Smith 1997; Binder 2003).
While members of the majority party can utilize the filibuster to further their own interests,
obstruction and its effects overwhelmingly harm the majority party (Alter and McGranahan
2000; Bawn and Koger 2008; Smith 2007).
These effects on legislation, nominations, and organization depend upon senators using
the filibuster, however. Discussed above is the increased filibuster usage and management
68
in the modern period (Beth 1995; Binder and Smith 1997; Binder 1999; Koger 2010; Sin-
clair 2001, 2002). Elected officials generally face a dilemma when engaging in obstruction.
Producing legislation, which is undermined by the filibuster and obstruction, constitutes a
legislative good (Mayhew 1974; Fenno 1978). This point especially holds in legislatures,
where members repeatedly interact and develop reputations over time (Baron and Ferejohn
1989; Meyer 1980). While passing legislation proves valuable to legislators, preventing
unfavored legislation from passing also provides benefits.
This discussion makes apparent that senators have many reasons to engage in obstruc-
tion. Binder and Smith (1997) discuss motivations for why senators choose to filibuster
centered on policy and personal beliefs, but the reasons can go beyond these broad classifi-
cations. Bell (2011) finds that individual preference and partisan status greatly affects who
chooses to engage in filibusters, with minority party members and ideological extremists
much more likely to engage in public obstruction. The changing electoral environment, in-
cluding the presence of quality challengers and the changing electoral environment, often
pushes senators to obstruct as well (Fenno 1989; Binder 2011; Wallner 2013; Patty N.d.).
Beyond these individual reasons, changes to Senate rules affect member motivations as
well (Koger 2010; Binder 2003). Lowering the cloture threshold made debate limits easier
to invoke, but also lowered the potential cost of obstructing as well. Similarly, centraliz-
ing agenda management provides for streamlined scheduling but may routinize obstruction
(Evans and Lipinski 2005, N.d.; Howard and Roberts 2015).
While scholars have focused much attention on filibusters and obstruction, this de-
scription makes apparent an unanswered puzzle in Senate scholarship. Past studies of ob-
struction observed through the filibuster tell us much about effects on broad policymaking
dynamics and how this tool has been used by individual senators. These studies tell us little
about how the filibuster affects individual bills, where we should see it used, and how the
filibuster fits within other obstructive strategies.That is, nearly all of the description above
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focuses on the institution or individual senators rather than examining what filibusters and
obstruction mean for individual bills.This chapter, continuing the focus of previous chap-
ters, explores the determinants of which bills are filibustered and if filibusters affect Senate
bill passage. Exploring individual bills will help our understanding of obstruction’s usage
and place, both for senators and legislation simultaneously.
4.2 Why Filibuster Bills?
The filibuster remains the weapon with the most potential impact in a senator’s arsenal,
but leaders can – and often do – try to circumvent this strategy. What makes filibusters
powerful, especially in the form of threats, is that any single senator has the potential to
filibuster at any time. Figure 4.1, replicated from Chapters 2 and 3, highlights this chapter’s
focus on the last stage of obstruction, and makes apparent that senators again face a choice
in their actions. While appearing as a separate choice in public, this choice is contingent
upon past action of both members and leaders. Which bills leaders decide to put on the
floor affects member’s decisions to filibuster those bills.3 This said, senators do not utilize
this tool in every situation where it may be effective. Neither do these senators utilize the
filibuster on every bill they dislike. Rather, they selectively utilize this tool to advance their
interests. This is clear when looking at the usage rates for filibusters. In the data utilized
throughout this dissertation, all Senate bills reported from committee, about 2% of bills
are targeted by filibusters (Bell 2011). This means that, while objection may exist in some
form, for the other 98% of bills there is no filibuster observed. This chapter asks what the
determinants are for which bills are targeted by filibusters, given that the potential exists
for any bill.
Elected officials are the best informed actors in the political world. They have access
3Senators almost entirely target their filibusters and obstruction at bills currently on the floor. This is
not to say that filibusters directed at legislation not reaching the floor is impossible. Senators can, and do,
filibuster individual items with the intention of making a point about an unrelated or only tangentially related
item. Rand Paul’s recent filibuster of the Brennan nomination is a case in point, where his filibuster dealt
primarily with the Obama administration’s usage of drone strikes.
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Figure 4.1: Process of Obstruction: Floor
Bill Introduced
Committee Referral
Report
Hold
Pull Bill Accommodate
Obstruct Not
Not Accommodate
Obstruct Not
No Hold
Proceed
Obstruct Not
Not
to information not publicly available, and often work with private parties – interest groups,
lobbyists, and NGOs – to craft their positions on bills and general policy areas. This is to
say that senators are knowledgable about their own interests. As for holds in chapter 2,
senators have policies they favor. They will work to push bills aligning with these interests
into law, and will act to protect the possibility that these bills pass the chamber. Senators
prefer policy that favors their interests, and will act against policy that goes against these
interests.
While this speaks to filibuster patterns among members, the rationale for actions on
individual bills lies in the relationship between individual members and leaders. Previous
actions by members provide signals to leaders – and in some ways may bind members to
their action. This signal to leaders provides leaders with information concerning member
71
actions, and establishes how members are likely to behave in a situation. These signals
are vitally important to both members and leaders in a legislature, where they will interact
repeatedly in similar situations. These repeated interactions, and the information contained
in these interactions, establish a member’s reputation among leadership. Reputation can
provide non-institutional enforcement of cooperation, enabling greater production of leg-
islative goods. Members have an incentive to cooperate, for their reputations as effective
lawmakers can be tied to how productive Congress appears to constituents.
Cooperation and productivity are not the only reputational incentives for elected of-
ficials, however. Senators may be interested in reelection, but legislators have many in-
centives for their actions – including reelection, policy, and power. Senators may object
to legislation for reelection reasons, but these reasons center primarily around the goals
of policy and power. While ideology and policy content matter for policy and power, the
power of an individual legislator’s reputation centers around expectations about their fu-
ture actions. Reputation is more than policy consistency, and may be equally based around
consistency of actions.
Senators who wish to be perceived as institutional moderates may project this image
by taking certain actions to position themselves as such. On the other hand, members who
wish to be perceived as recalcitrant, reluctant assenters may also project this image through
the actions they take. Howard Metzenbaum (D-OH) embodied this image by stating that
“I’ve made it clear I don’t intend to let these things go through [...] I’ve added three or
four tax bills to my [obstructing] list because I don’t even know what they contain.”4 Thus,
members may wish to be perceived as a certain type in order to position themselves for
repeated bargaining and power within the institution, and will behave accordingly.
Obstruction is possible on any bill which reaches the floor, but members who privately
object are providing information to leaders about their potential for future objection. While
4Quoted in Sinclair, Ward. “Metzenbaum Uses Hold to Choke Off Colleagues’ Pre-Election Largess.”
Washington Post. October 1, 1982. A3
72
senators can object to any bill on the floor, their reputation may be more tied to legislation
on which party leaders are aware of previous objection. Filibusters on bills are not isolated
incidences. Figure 4.1 makes this apparent, with eventual floor action coming only after
off-floor action and negotiation. Not only do leaders act before potential filibusters occur,
but individual members act prior to filibusters as well.
This previous action, and leaders’ knowledge of the action, makes elected officials more
likely to obstruct. The signal provided through holds informs leaders of probable action,
and enables leaders to make judgements based on observed actions. Leaders receive hold
requests, accommodate members or not, and then members can choose to obstruct. Repu-
tations are constructed in this process for members, as threatening legislation prior to floor
consideration without obstructing this legislation when placed on the floor reveals infor-
mation about the member. Leaders see this inaction and learn from the member’s behavior.
When members threaten further legislation, leaders will be less likely to appease members
or pull bills from the floor, as little incentive exists without member action. Members know
this and will act to protect their reputations and interests, both for the current bill and fu-
ture bills. Thus filibustering decisions center not only on the policy, but also on protecting
a member’s future interests within the institution.
This is primarily true for threats to kill legislation. Whereas members requesting
changes to legislation can be appeased through managing bill content, as with the Ashcroft
example in Chapter 3, threats to kill legislation cannot. Members placing a killer hold are
consciously sending a different message to leaders than those utilizing amendment or no-
tification related holds. These senators are telling leaders that any attempt to bring the bill
up for consideration will cause on-floor obstruction to occur, regardless of any attempt to
appease them. This stands opposed to members sending other types of holds, where leaders
can provide either notification of proceeding or policy-related payoffs to encourage mem-
bers to not object to legislation. These threats in particular affect reputation, as members
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are in many respects daring leaders to put the bill on the floor and endure floor fights. Fail-
ing to filibuster following these threats has the potential to directly undermine a member’s
reputational advantages from obstruction. Thus, I expect legislation on which a killer hold
is placed to be more likely to receive a filibuster than not. Additionally, these bills should
be more likely to be targeted by filibusters than bills receiving non-killer holds.
While I am not concerned with calculating individual senator reputations in this study,
this has direct implications for what should be expected for bills. Holding senators are,
in essence, notifying leaders that obstruction through filibusters will occur if they are not
appeased prior to consideration. Members notifying leaders of this objection and not fol-
lowing through on their threats causes leaders to update their perception of members. These
leaders will be less likely to accede to threats in the future, harming the senator’s policy,
institutional, and reputational power. This stands opposed to the situation in which mem-
bers follow through with their threats, notifying leaders that future threats are likely to be
treated similarly in the future. Thus, while members are able to filibuster legislation on
which they do not place holds, I expect filibusters to fit within a senator’s strategy set rather
than being a completely separate tool.
Filibusters are used to advance member’s interests, as well as fitting within their strat-
egy sets. Elected officials will not only protect their reputations with filibusters, but will
also use filibusters to benefit their policy interests. Filibusters and on-floor obstruction are
more effective at the end of sessions, when members can run out the clock on a session
to prevent passage. This effectiveness in killing legislation when utilized later in sessions
and Congresses should not make filibuster occurrence more likely. Rather, on floor ob-
struction should be less likely as time becomes rarer. Senators are aware of not only their
own interests – which bills they are likely to support and find objectionable – but also how
their actions are likely to affect those interests. Members know they potentially harm their
own interests when utilizing increasingly rare time, and will be less likely to use obstructive
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measures when time decreases. Despite the lack of statistical significance for time in Chap-
ter 2, I expect this effect to appear for filibusters. The usage of filibusters requires actually
holding the floor and stopping consideration of all bills, rather than potentially affecting
floor time. Holding the floor directly prevents consideration of legislation a senator favors,
and senators desiring to pass bills will filibuster less on bills considered later in Congresses
in order to consider alternate legislation.
Members only advance their interests and establish reputations on bills considered on
the floor. As members have a vested interest in not only passing legislation but also sending
signals to leaders about their preferences, they will object to legislation on the floor for
this purpose. Scheduling and consideration advantages for majority parties in legislatures,
including the Senate mean that majority sponsored legislation will be the target of this
obstruction far more often than not. To establish their reputation, members will target
this available legislation sponsored by members of the majority party even if members of
that party themselves. While members of the majority party may be less likely to use this
obstructive tool in order to advance their procedural, filibusters will be more likely to be
directed against available majority legislation. This reputation and interest-based theory
results in four hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: Held bills will be more likely to be targeted by on-floor filibusters
Hypothesis 2: Bills with killer holds will be more likely to be targeted by on-floor filibusters
than bills not targeted by killer holds, and will be more likely to be filibustered than bills
with non-killer holds
Hypothesis 3: Filibusters will be more likely on bills introduced early in a Congress
Hypothesis 4: Filibusters will be more likely on bills sponsored by members of the majority
party
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4.3 Research Design
The two preceding chapters have concerned themselves primarily with either pre-floor
or off-floor proceedings. Whether through private, confidential holds registered with party
leaders, or those leaders negotiating complex Unanimous Consent Agreements between
themselves and with membership, procedural tools shape outcomes. Of course, these tools
matter little if they do not affect passage, which has been shown to be true for both tactics.
The chapters leave an outstanding question, however. Do these tools affect what happens
on the floor? That is, do private holds actually affect the incidence of public obstruction
and attempts to manage obstruction? Throughout this dissertation I have assumed that this
is true, and that leaders manage the floor attempting to control this time-eating tactic.
This chapter moves to observing member actions on the floor in an attempt to answer
this question. I utilize Senate originated legislation reported from committee in the 1977-
1996 period, the same data present in Chapter 2. This continuity allows me to follow the
process in Figure 4.1, and include off-floor obstruction through holds into the usage of
filibusters.5 Thus, for the first section of results below the dependent variable will be the
presence or absence of a Filibuster while the second section will focus on bill passage.
What constitutes a filibuster is not without controversy. Burdette (1940) was doubtlessly
correct when he stated that some filibusters will forever go unrecognized. Several scholars
have attempted to compile lists of filibustered legislation and nominations, beginning in the
modern period with Beth (1995). Binder (1999) attempted to expand this list, as have Koger
(2010) and Bell (2011). I utilize Bell’s list, provided in her book’s appendix, over Koger’s
list for two reasons. First, while Koger’s list is more expansive, much of the expansion is
based on newspaper accounts of filibusters. Bell’s list utilizes some of this information,
but utilizes it to a lesser degree while relying more on the Congressional Record. Second,
5The data limitations in Chapter 3 prevent me from utilizing leader behavior through complex UCAs at
this time. Future versions of this chapter will include the leader actions discussed in Chapter 3 in order to
gain a better understanding of how leaders see threats and potential reputation.
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Bell’s list provides, where possible, the identities of the filibustering senators. I utilize this
information below to test the implications of my first and second hypotheses, as the holds
data available relate only to Republican actions.
The first and second hypotheses address the effect holds have on filibusters, and these
are dichotomous measures of activity. Hold indicates the presence or absence of any type of
hold, while Killer Hold is the presence of a killer hold on a bill and Non-Killer Hold shows
the presence of a hold on a bill without being of the killer type. Months addresses the
third hypothesis, and is a count of the number of months remaining upon bill introduction.
Majority Sponsor is a dichotomous indication of the majority status of the bill sponsor, and
relates to the fourth hypothesis.
As in previous chapters I control for a variety of bill-specific and institutional fea-
tures. Sponsor Ideology measures the bill sponsor’s ideology through first dimension DW-
NOMINATE scores, and helps to control for confounding effects in Majority Sponsor.
Sponsor Seniority measures the number of Congresses in which a bill sponsor has served,
and Committee Leader Sponsor refers to a bill sponsor’s committee chair or ranking mem-
ber status. I also utilize two bill specific variables, Policy Committee, andMultiple Referral.
Policy Committee indicates if a bill was considered in a high-profile, policy oriented com-
mittee, while Multiple Referral indicates whether a bill was considered in two or more
committees rather than a single committee.6
4.4 Analysis
Table 4.1 presents the first models relating holds to filibusters. Both models in this table
have the presence or absence of any filibuster as the dependent variable, and are logistic
regression models. Each coefficient in this table represents the effect of a one unit increase
in the covariate on the probability of a bill being targeted by a filibuster. Model 1 presents
6Policy committees in Deering and Smith (1997) are: Budget, Foreign Relations, Governmental Affairs,
Judiciary, and Labor. Several studies have utilized a similar approach to generating categories of committees,
including Fenno (1973).
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the effect of any hold on the probability of a filibuster, while Model 2 separates holds into
bills targeted by a Killer Hold and those targeted by only Non-Killer Holds.
Model 1 in Table 4.1 demonstrates clear support for my first hypothesis. The presence
of a hold does predict filibusters in a positive and statistically significant manner.7 Indeed,
holding all other variables at their relative means – medians for dichotomous variables –
holds strongly predict filibusters. With a hold, the probability of a bill being filibustered is
3.33%. This stands opposed to the absence of a hold on a bill, where the probability of a
filibuster is approximately 1/5 of when a hold is present, or 0.73%. In absolute terms this
is a substantively small change, but it does explain a significant portion of the variance in
what is targeted by filibusters. This provides strong support for the first hypothesis.
The effect of time on the probability a bill is targeted by a filibuster is also positive and
statistically significant. A one unit increase in Months increases the probability a bill is
targeted by a filibuster. A bill introduced with 16 months remaining in the Congress, the
mean number of months remaining, has a 0.96% probability of being filibustered, while
moving one standard deviation of 6 months toward the beginning of the session increases
this probability to 1.43%. Additionally, majority sponsored legislation is far more likely
to be targeted by filibusters. A majority sponsored bill has a 1.3% probability of being
targeted by filibusters, whereas a minority sponsored bill has a 0.2% probability. While
this decrease is not substantively equivalent to hold’s effect, the decrease is on par with
holds in magnitude. These results provide strong support for hypotheses 3 and 4.
Several of the control variables present interesting results as well. The effect of addi-
tional cosponsors for a bill is positive and statistically significantly related to the probability
a bill is filibustered. This result is perhaps unsurprising given the similar result for the prob-
ability of holds in Chapter 2. Interestingly, no other bill-specific control variable reaches
7While the model does not include a control for a direct relation between the holder and the filibustering
senator, these are almost always the same person. A filibustering senator may not be the only holder for a
bill, but they are among the holding senators if there is more than one.
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standard levels of statistical significance. Thus, the ideology of the bill sponsor, multiple
referral, and consideration in a policy committee all have no discernible effect on the prob-
ability a bill is filibustered. The only sponsor specific control variable with a statistically
significant relationship to the probability of a filibuster is if the bill sponsor is a committee
leader. Bills sponsored by these committee leaders are significantly more likely to be tar-
geted by filibusters. Additionally, bills introduced under Dole’s leadership are more likely
to be targeted by filibusters in a statistically significant manner.
These results provide strong support for three of the four hypotheses, but cannot speak
to hypothesis 2. Model 2 in Table 4.1 evaluates the hypotheses that killer holds will both
have a statistically significant effect on the probability of filibusters and that bills targeted
by killer holds will have a higher probability of filibusters than bills targeted only by other
types of holds. Model 2 presents clear support of the first portion of hypothesis 2, as the
presence of a killer holds on a bill is positively and statistically significantly related to the
probability of a filibuster. That is, compared to bills which are not targeted by killer holds
there is a higher probability that the bill will be filibustered when targeted by a killer hold.
The evidence for the second portion of hypothesis 2, that bills targeted by killer holds
will be more likely than those targeted only by non-killer holds, is more nuanced. The
coefficient for Killer Hold is indeed larger than that of Non-Killer Hold, and the substantive
effect of the two is different as well. Bills not targeted by a Non-Killer Hold are likely to
be targeted by holds at 0.86%, whereas the presence of a non-killer hold increases this
probability to 2.8%. The difference for the predicted probability of filibusters for bills with
a Killer Hold are much greater however, with a filibuster probability of 0.79% on a bill
without a killer hold and those with killer holds 4.98%. That is, the average effect for a
Non-killer Hold is 2%, while the average effect of a Killer Hold is 4.2%. The difference
in substantive effects provides evidence that there is a greater effect for killer holds than
other types, and that bills targeted by killer holds are more likely to be filibustered as well.
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Table 4.1: Bills Targeted by Filibusters in the Senate
Variable Model 1 Model 2
Hold 1.539⇤ –
(0.265) –
Killer Hold – 1.880⇤
– (0.312)
Non-Killer Hold – 1.202⇤
– (0.333)
Months 0.066⇤ 0.066⇤
(0.024) (0.024)
Majority Sponsor 1.844⇤ 1.884⇤
(0.642) (0.649)
Cosponsors 0.027⇤ 0.026⇤
(0.007) (0.007)
Sponsor Ideology 0.662 0.733
(0.591) (0.597)
Polity Committee 0.276 0.272
(0.266) (0.268)
Multiple Referral 0.268 0.290
(0.454) (0.454)
Sponsor Seniority 0.018 0.017
(0.033) (0.033)
Committee Leader Sponsor 0.898⇤ 0.869⇤
(0.346) (0.346)
Republican Majority 0.040 0.094
(0.447) (0.452)
Dole as Leader 1.150⇤ 1.248⇤
(0.440) (0.443)
Intercept -9.222⇤ -9.345⇤
(0.911) (0.916)
N 3096 3096
Log-likelihood -278.366 -276.513
 2(11) 127.19 130.90
Note: Estimates are from an logistic regression model. The dependent variable is coded 1 if the bill was
filibustered and 0 if not. Standard errors in parentheses. ⇤ = p  0.05.
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Thus, I find strong support for killer holds leading to filibusters, and convincing evidence
that killer holds are more likely to lead to filibusters than non-killer holds.
While the models in Table 4.1 present compelling evidence for the hypotheses detailed
above, the data does not present the most direct test of the mechanism for interactions
between members and leaders. Given that I have only hold data from Republicans, the
question is if the results stand up when only looked at through filibusters in which Republi-
cans were directly involved. That is, given that the question underlying the research design
above is if members are more likely to filibuster bills on which they have given leaders
prior notice. To most directly answer this question, Table 4.2 looks at only filibusters in
which Republicans were directly involved, and not simply any filibuster which occurred on
the floor.
The results presented in Table 4.2 provide similar inferences to all filibusters. The pres-
ence of a Hold placed by Republicans on a bill has a positive and statistically significant
effect on the probability of a filibuster, making a filibuster approximately 1.5% more likely.
Killer Holds remain positively and statistically significantly related to filibusters, as do
Non-Killer Holds. While the substantive difference between the two is not as dramatic as
for all filibusters, with Non-Killer Holds making filibusters 1.17% more likely and Killer
Holds making filibusters 2.87% more likely. The difference between the two remains sub-
stantively important, confirming both hypotheses 2a and 2b. Bill introduced earlier in the
session are more likely to receive Republican involved filibusters. Additionally, the major-
ity status of the bill sponsor has a positive and statistically significant effect when looking
at only Republican involved filibusters while controlling for Republican majorities.
Whether looking at all filibusters in Table 4.1 or Republican involved filibusters in
Table 4.2, I find clear support for all my hypotheses. Holds are clearly related to filibusters,
both for holds as a general category and each subcategory. Killer holds are more strongly
related to filibusters than non-killer holds, although the difference is smaller for Republican
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Table 4.2: Bills Targeted by Republican Filibusters
Variable Model 1 Model 2
Hold 1.521⇤ –
(0.327) –
Killer Hold – 1.863⇤
– (0.371)
Non-Killer Hold – 1.129⇤
– (0.417)
Months 0.072⇤ 0.073⇤
(0.030) (0.030)
Majority Sponsor 1.663⇤ 1.707⇤
(0.764) (0.770)
Cosponsors 0.030⇤ 0.029⇤
(0.008) (0.008)
Sponsor Ideology -0.015 0.054
(0.720) (0.727)
Policy Committee 0.420 0.415
(0.325) (0.327)
Multiple Referral -1.315 -1.288
(1.025) (1.025)
Sponsor Seniority -0.016 -0.017
(0.043) (0.043)
Committee Leader Sponsor 0.958⇤ 0.921⇤
(0.416) (0.416)
Republican Majoirty 0.009 0.073
(0.540) (0.545)
Dole as Leader 0.785 0.878
(0.493) (0.495)
Intercept -9.146⇤ -9.269⇤
(1.076) (1.080)
N 3096 3096
Log-likelihood -200.97 -199.409
 2(11,12) 93.312 96.434
Note: Estimates are from an logistic regression model. The dependent variable is coded 1 if the bill was
filibustered by Republicans and 0 if not. Standard errors in parentheses. ⇤ = p  0.05.
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involved filibuster. Important to note is that the majority of these filibusters are those which
the member placed a hold on the relevant bill, and many of these eventually filibustered bills
received multiple holds. While not all holding senators are involved in filibusters, what
is clear is that leaders often have prior notice of intent to object before filibusters occur.
Additionally, bills introduced early in Congresses are more likely to receive filibusters, and
majority sponsored legislation is much more likely to be targeted by filibusters.
Given these results supporting my hypotheses, I next move to evaluating the effect
filibusters have on bill passage. Chapter 2 demonstrated that holds, both general and killer
holds exclusively, have clear effects on bill passage. This chapter demonstrates that holds
have clear linkages to filibusters, explaining much of the variance in filibuster occurrence.
Thus, Table 4.3 presents three models with differing treatments of holds. Model 1 utilizes
the separate categories for holds. In this model I find that each category of hold is related
to bill passage, and that there is a slight, but not large, difference between the two hold
categories. Importantly, I find no statistically significant relationship between Republican
filibusters and bill passage.8
To more fully evaluate the effect filibusters have on bill passage, Model 2 in Table 4.3
condenses holds into a single category. As in Chapter 2, I find a statistically significant
relationship between these holds and bill passage. Even after condensing holds into a sin-
gle category I still do not find a relationship between Republican filibusters and passage,
however. To test for any effect filibusters may have on passage, Model 3 removes holds
from the estimation procedure entirely. This model still does not find a statistically sig-
nificant relationship between filibusters and bill passage, however. This, combined with
the comparative model fit statistics, demonstrates that holds should be included to explain
bill passage and filibusters may not have an outsize effect on floor consideration on a bill-
specific level.
8This remains true for all models in Table 4.3 if the filibuster definition is changed to all filibusters.
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Table 4.3: Bill Passage in the Senate
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Republican Filibuster -0.057 -0.074 -0.390
(0.311) (0.310) (0.303)
Killer Hold -1.064⇤ – –
(0.137) – –
Non-Kiiller Hold -0.833⇤ – –
(0.145) – –
Hold – -0.958⇤ –
– (0.106) –
Months Remaining 0.025⇤ 0.025⇤ 0.024⇤
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Majority Sponsor -0.037 -0.034 -0.103
(0.100) (0.100) (0.099)
Cosponsors 0.006⇤ 0.006⇤ 0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Sponsor Ideology 0.444⇤ 0.443⇤ 0.528⇤
(0.130) (0.130) (0.128)
Policy Committee -0.111 -0.110 -0.137
(0.082) (0.082) (0.080)
Multiple Referral -1.047⇤ -1.049⇤ -1.089⇤
(0.180) (0.180) (0.178)
Sponsor Seniority -0.012 -0.013 -0.019
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Committee Leader Sponsor 0.066 0.068 0.103
(0.098) (0.098) (0.097)
Republican Majority -1.076⇤ -1.065⇤ -0.938⇤
(0.097) (0.097) (0.094)
Dole as Leader -0.595⇤ -0.577⇤ -0.528⇤
(0.092) (0.091) (0.090)
Intercept 0.866⇤ 0.844⇤ 0.743⇤
(0.169) (0.168) (0.166)
N 3096 3096 3096
Log-likelihood -2004.706 -2005.486 -2047.817
 2(13) 278.357 276.796 192.135
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4.4.1 On-Floor Amendments
A second remaining question for floor consideration in the Senate is the effect of
amendments. Chapter 3 demonstrated that there is not a clear relationship between holds
and leadership management efforts. I expected, but did not find, that holds predict lead-
ership behavior through complex UCAs. That this remains true no matter the limitations
placed on the data leads to questions concerning how leaders see threats in their man-
agement efforts. Is there a floor-based reason why leaders do not capitulate to member
demands and craft complex UCAs when members threaten proceedings?
I examine the connection between holds, amendments allowed on the floor, and final
passage votes in the Senate. While I do not have a comprehensive list of amendments of-
fered in the 99th Congress, which would allow for a direct comparison to the results in
Chapter 3, I do have a comprehensive list for the 101st-104th Congresses. Pairing these
presented amendments with holds that state their goal as changing the content of legisla-
tion in some fashion allows us to see member and leader interaction. Howard and Roberts
(2015) demonstrate that, depending on the Congress, between 10% and 42% of holds ac-
tually seek to alter legislation through either adding amendments or removing parts of the
bill. That is, these holds are not an inconsiderable amount of the data for any Congress and
members routinely use holds to threaten the specific content of legislation.
Table 4.4 provides an exploration of if holds requesting the ability to alter bills are
honored, utilizing data on every floor amendment presented in the 101st through 104th
Congresses.9 The data utilized here are all holds regardless of bill type, and not simply
Senate originated bills as discussed above. This table takes each hold stating either specific
or general amendment requests, along with requests to remove parts of the bill, and asks if
related amendments were presented on the floor. For example, Mitch McConnell (R-KY)
sought to have his right to offer an amendment about regulating nonprofit organizations
9I thank Chris Den Hartog and Nate Monroe for making their amendments data available to me.
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Table 4.4: Amendment Hold Demands Accommodated
Congress Not Accommodated Accommodated Total
101 69 26 95
(72.63%) (27.37%)
102 40 11 51
(78.43%) (21.57%)
103 14 6 20
(70.0%) (30.0%)
104 62 22 84
(73.81%) (26.19%)
Total 185 65 250
(74.0%) (26.0%)
Note: Cells are the number of amendments in a Congress by presented status. Row percentages in
parentheses.
protected when The National and Community Service Act of 1990 was considered.10 Mc-
Connell submitted to Republican Leader Dole on February 20, 1990. The party leadership
allowed McConnell to present his amendment to the Senate in deliberation over the bill
after this hold was received. While the amendment ultimately failed through a motion to
table, McConnell’s hold was honored in that he was allowed to offer his amendment on the
floor.
Two aspects of these data are immediately apparent from this table. First, far more
requests are not honored than are honored. That is, a member requesting the ability to offer
an amendment changing the bill was far less likely to be able to present this amendment
on the floor. Second, the lack of floor amendments allowed for Republican holds in the
104th Congress – the only Republican majority in Table 4.4 –is striking. These procedural
advantages do not appear to equate to Republicans allowing co-partisans to change bills,
however. This suggests that amendment related holds were viewed as potentially valuable
by individual senators, but majority status does not necessarily confer disproportionate
10This bill, which sought to streamline community service and volunteer programs and their regulation in
the United States, was Introduced in the Senate on July 27, 1989 and reported from the Committee on Labor
and Human Resources on October 27, 1989.
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Table 4.5: Final Passage Votes by Amendment Allowed on the Floor
Accommodated Not Accommodated Total
Yea Vote 21 23 44
(58.33%) (60.53%) (59.46%)
Nay Vote 15 15 30
(41.67%) (39.47%) (40.54%)
Total 38 36 74
Note: Cells are the number of final passage votes by presented status. Column percentages in parentheses.
advantage to individual senators. The allowed percentage for the 104th is almost exactly
the average for this period, with 26.19% allowed. While these hold requests were regularly
utilized by senators, with 250 in an eight year period, they are only successful 26% of the
time.
Given that senators are often not allowed to offer their requests on the floor, the next
question is if this alters votes on bills. Table 4.5 provides an overview of this question,
taking all amendment related holds and asking if the senator requesting the hold voted for
or against the bill on final passage.11 The patterns in this table suggest that there is minimal
difference in voting patterns on final passage for senators whose holds are honored versus
those who are not. The observed pattern is the opposite of what would be expected, with
60.53% of senators whose holds are not honored voting yes, and 58.33% of senators whose
holds are not honored voting yes. In short, it is not apparent from looking at final passage
proceedings that leaders pay a heavy price for ignoring the wishes of individual senators.
4.5 Discussion
This chapter provides an initial exploration of filibusters and on-floor proceedings and both
membership and leadership tools. My findings speak to the targeted nature of filibusters, as
well as how filibusters themselves fit within the strategy set of individual senators. Senators
perceive their own interests when choosing to obstruct legislation, not only in terms of bills
11There were two votes in which a senator with an amendment request abstained from the final passage
vote. These two observations are not used in this table.
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they oppose but also the amount of legislation they support still at risk. Thus senators are
more likely to obstruct legislation introduced earlier in the Congress than later. The results
above also suggest that while Alter and McGranahan (2000) state that there are situations in
which the filibuster can be a majority tool to be used against the minority, this is in general
not the case. Majority sponsored legislation has a much higher probability of being targeted
by filibusters as opposed to minority sponsored legislation, indicating that the filibuster is
in general a tool used against the majority party. Importantly, this does not necessarily
show that filibusters are a tool used by the minority against the majority. The dependent
variable in Table 4.2 is only Republican involved filibusters, and the similar effect indicates
that members target majority legislation – in many cases of their own party.
Also clear is that filibusters do not occur in isolation. These are, in general, not random
occurrences where leaders have no prior information of potential objection. Filibusters are
rather a step in the obstructionist process for members, and leaders are most likely aware
of this progression. Holds are a powerful predictor for filibusters, both for all holds and
each subcategory of intent. Leaders can also gain information from the type of hold sent
to them by members, as bills on which killer holds have been placed are more likely to be
filibustered on the floor than bills which receive other types of holds. What this indicates
is that members most likely view obstruction as an entire tool chest of actions, and each
action within their arsenal is connected to others. Leaders also most likely know this and
react accordingly.
This connection between actions for members, and that leaders are likely aware of this
connection, makes the results for the passage model intriguing. While held bills are more
likely to result in filibusters, a consistent result from Chapters 2 and 3, filibusters have no
discernible effect on passage. That is, a bill targeted by a filibuster is no less likely to pass
the chamber than one not targeted. The connection between holds and filibusters makes
this a potentially unusual result, given that holds have a powerful negative effect on bill
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passage. What this says is that leaders know they are potentially unlikely to be negatively
harmed by moving a popular or must-pass bill to the floor, so long as they can get passage
support in the face of obstruction.
My findings also speak to the complicated relationship between leader management
bill consideration. I fail to find any relationship between the usage of a complex UCA and
holds in Chapter 3, and the results above indicate that leaders routinely ignore member
requests to present amendments on the floor. Given the strongly negative relationship of
holds and bill passage, one might assume that leaders would accommodate holds through
complex UCAs and allow amendments on the floor. While I again hesitate to say that no
relationship exists due to the data available in Chapter 3, a possible interpretation of the
data is that leaders know there is both a high threshold for members to actually object on
the floor and such objection is unlikely to affect passage. Further work is necessary on this
project, both to expand the data available and parse the content of complex UCAs, but the
results presented are promising for expanding our understanding of policymaking in the
Senate.
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